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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECTS OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION ON CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY: EVIDENCE FROM TRADE SECRETS 
Stephen Glaeser  
Robert Holthausen  
Christopher Armstrong 
 
I examine the effects of proprietary information on corporate transparency and voluntary 
disclosure. To do so, I develop and validate two measures of firms’ reliance on trade 
secrecy: one based on 10-K disclosures and one based on subsequent litigation outcomes. 
I complement these measures by using the staggered passage of the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act as a shock to trade secrecy. I find that firms that begin to rely more heavily on trade 
secrecy substitute increased voluntary disclosure of nonproprietary information for 
decreased disclosure of proprietary information. The total effect of trade secrecy is a 
decrease in corporate transparency. 
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The Effects of Proprietary Information on Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: 
Evidence from Trade Secrets 
 
Introduction 
 
I examine the effects of proprietary information on corporate disclosure and 
transparency. Prior work on the effects of proprietary information largely focuses on the 
effects of product market competition, and finds conflicting evidence that product market 
competition both encourages and discourages voluntary disclosure.1 In this paper, I 
document the effects of a different type of proprietary information – trade secrets. Trade 
secrets are information that derive future economic value from not being appropriable by 
competitors (e.g., unpatented innovations). Because accounting reports largely focus on 
historical activity, they likely have limited ability to communicate the value of trade secrets 
(Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010).  
Prior work suggests that managers respond to decreases in the ability of accounting 
reports to communicate future economic value by increasing their voluntary disclosure.2 
However, managers cannot publicly disclose trade secret information to investors without 
also revealing that information to competitors and other third parties. Therefore, I predict 
                                                          
1 E.g., empirically, Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Harris, 1998; Botosan and Harris, 2000; Botosan and Stanford, 
2005; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Verrecchia and Weber, 2006; Berger and Hann, 2007; Dedman and Lennox, 
2009; Li, 2010; Bens, Berger, and Monahan, 2011; Ellis, Fee, and Thomas, 2012; Ali, Klasa, and Yeung, 
2014; Huang, Jennings, and Yu, 2016; and Tian and Yu, 2017. E.g., analytically, Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 
1985; Dye, 1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Feltham, Gigler, and Hughes, 1992; 
Feltham and Xie, 1992; Darrough, 1993; and Gigler, 1994.  
2 See, e.g., Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 2016. Coller and Yohn, 1997; Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and 
Ljungqvist, 2014; Billings, Jennings, and Lev, 2015; and Barth, Landsman, and Taylor, 2017 find that 
managers respond to decreases in corporate transparency by increasing their voluntary disclosure.  
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that trade secrecy discourages the voluntary disclosure of information that is proprietary 
with respect to the trade secret (Verrecchia, 1983). Because of this nondisclosure, investors 
may be unable to ascertain the value of a firm’s trade secret, increasing information 
asymmetry between investors and managers.  
Nevertheless, managers may be able to ameliorate the information asymmetry 
around trade secrecy by increasing their disclosure of information that is nonproprietary 
with respect to the trade secret. For example, managers can release information about future 
earnings without revealing specifics about their trade secrets. Therefore, I predict managers 
will substitute increased voluntary disclosure of nonproprietary information for decreased 
disclosure of proprietary information when protecting trade secrets. However, managers’ 
increased disclosure of nonproprietary information is unlikely to address fully the increased 
information asymmetry around trade secrets because the source of the asymmetry is the 
undisclosed proprietary information. Therefore, I predict that the net effect of trade secrecy 
is increased information asymmetry between managers and investors, and among investors 
(Kim and Verrecchia, 1997).3 
Beyond the role of trade secrecy in informing us about the effects of proprietary 
information on corporate disclosure and transparency, examining trade secrets is also 
important because of their economic significance. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
estimates that publicly traded U.S. companies own $5 trillion in trade secrets, equivalent 
                                                          
3 Kim and Verrecchia (1997) show that disclosure of managers’ private information can theoretically 
increase or decrease information asymmetry among investors, depending on whether managers’ private 
information would complement or substitute for investors’ private information. I assume trade secrecy 
increases the information advantage of informed investors because managers are typically also investors 
and because some investors may be better equipped to discern the unknown value of trade secrets. 
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to approximately 20% of total market capitalization (Chamber of Commerce, 2016). Prior 
survey evidence suggests that firms view trade secrecy as more important than patents for 
protecting the value of innovations and choose not to patent the majority of their 
innovations.4 Yet, despite their economic importance, our understanding of the effects and 
determinants of trade secrecy is limited (e.g., Cohen, 2010). The most likely reason for this 
gap in our understanding is that identifying the presence of trade secrets is challenging. In 
this paper, I use three separate, but complementary, empirical approaches to overcome this 
challenge.  
First, I use the staggered passage of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) by 
different states at different times in a differences-in-differences research design (Png, 
2017). The UTSA increased the obtainable remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets, 
extended many statutes of limitations on trade secret litigation, and reduced uncertainty 
about the legal protections afforded to trade secrets (Samuels and Johnson, 1990). 
Consequently, firms protected by the UTSA are more likely to pursue trade secrecy. A 
benefit of the UTSA tests is that they allow me to draw causal inferences about the effects 
of trade secrecy if the differences-in-differences assumptions are satisfied. However, 
compliance with the UTSA was imperfect because firms affected by the UTSA did not 
have to pursue trade secrecy, and unaffected firms were not prevented from pursuing trade 
secrecy. Therefore, a potential limitation of the UTSA tests is that they estimate a treatment 
effect for marginal compliers only. If the effects of trade secrecy are heterogeneous this 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Arundel, 2001; and Jankowski, 
2012. 
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marginal treatment effect may not generalize to the average effect of trade secrecy (e.g., 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996; Blundell and Dias, 2009; Glaeser and Guay, 2017). 
 To address the potentially limited generalizability of the UTSA tests, I develop a 
disclosure-based measure to identify firms protecting trade secrets. Regulation S-K 
requires firms with valuable trade secrets to discuss the risk of misappropriation in the 10-
K. Therefore, I identify the presence of a trade secret using 10-K discussions of trade 
secrecy. A strength of this measure is that it is broadly available: 41% of sample 10-Ks 
include a discussion of trade secrecy. However, a potential limitation of this measure is 
that it reflects the presence, but not the value, of a trade secret (i.e., it is imprecise).5  
 To address the potential imprecision of my disclosure-based measure, I develop a 
litigation-based measure of the value of individual trade secrets (Lerner, 2006; Searle, 
2010). I base this measure on the court’s assessment of trade secrets during trade secret 
misappropriation rulings and settlements. Specifically, I search all firms’ 10-Ks for 
references to trade secret cases and collect settlement and ruling data for these cases from 
Lexis Nexis and Public Access to Electronic Records (PACER). I augment this search with 
all trade secret misappropriation cases tried criminally under the Economic Espionage Act 
(EEA). I use these cases to construct a measure of the value and development date of 
subsequently misappropriated trade secrets. A benefit of this measure is that it uses 
                                                          
5 Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) highlight how imprecision is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of 
equilibria characterized by information asymmetry. Their arguments applied to my setting suggests that if I 
could perfectly identify the value distribution of trade secrets across firms, then investors should be able to 
as well. If investors can identify the value of trade secrets, there should be no pooling of different firm 
types and no information asymmetry. Therefore, imprecision in the measurement of trade secret values is 
necessary for trade secrecy to result in information asymmetry (Berger, 2011 makes similar arguments 
regarding competition, agency costs, and disclosure). Researchers can overcome this limitation by 
examining information that was unobserved by investors, or only revealed ex post (e.g., Bhattacharya and 
Ritter, 1983; Bens et al., 2011).  
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information revealed ex post to measure information that was ex ante confidential. A 
potential limitation of this measure is that it is subject to selection biases because the 
revealed trade secret must be misappropriated and a subsequent ruling or non-confidential 
settlement agreement must reveal its value and development date.  
I validate my litigation-based and disclosure-based measures as proxies for firms 
with trade secrets in a number of ways. I find that both measures are related to determinants 
of trade secrecy drawn from theory and survey responses, including firm size, research and 
development expenditures, and the legal protections afforded trade secrets. I also find that 
the proxies are negatively related to future patent filings and patent citations, and positively 
related to one another. 
My empirical findings are summarized as follows. Firms that begin pursuing trade 
secrecy increase their propensity to redact portions of the 10-K, consistent with these firms 
limiting their disclosure of proprietary information. Redactions are a fitting (inverse) 
measure of proprietary disclosure in my setting because they must be approved by the SEC, 
and one of the few allowable justifications is a desire to protect proprietary information (17 
CFR 200.80(b)(4)). Firms that begin pursuing trade secrecy also increase their propensity 
to issue earnings guidance and the total quantity of guidance they issue. To the extent that 
earnings information is nonproprietary with respect to trade secrets, this finding suggests 
that firms with trade secrets substitute nonproprietary disclosure for proprietary disclosure. 
Finally, firms that begin pursuing trade secrecy experience decreases in transparency, as 
reflected by increases in analyst absolute forecast errors, analyst disagreement, bid-ask 
spreads, and share illiquidity.  
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My findings are largely consistent across all three of my empirical approaches. 
Throughout my main tests, I include firm fixed effects to control for time invariant aspects 
of the firm, year fixed effects to control for common macroeconomic shocks, and controls 
for time-varying firm and state attributes. I also show that my inferences from using the 
UTSA as a shock to trade secrecy do not appear to be explained by pre-existing differential 
trends for firms affected by the UTSA. Collectively, my findings are consistent with my 
theoretical predictions and appear robust to alternative explanations. 
I extend my main tests by examining the types of information that firms with trade 
secrets redact from the 10-K. I classify redacted information based on a modified version 
of the classification introduced by Boone, Floros, and Johnson (2016). Because this 
classification requires hand collection, I examine the subset of firms that adopt or cease 
trade secrecy and a matched sample of firms that do not. I find that firms that begin 
pursuing trade secrecy increase their propensity to redact information related to research, 
supplier, and customer agreements. These findings shed light on how firms use redactions 
to withhold information related to their research plans, production materials, and product 
information to protect their trade secrets.  
I contribute to the literature that examines the effects of proprietary information on 
voluntary disclosure by documenting evidence that managers substitute nonproprietary 
disclosure for proprietary disclosure when relying on proprietary information. Prior 
empirical work in this area largely focuses on the effects of product market competition 
and finds mixed results. Several explanations have been offered for these mixed results, 
including the endogeneity of product market competition (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 
2010; Berger, 2011), the difficulty of accurately measuring product market competition 
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(Ali et al., 2014), and the ambiguity of the relation between product market competition 
and the proprietary costs of different disclosure methods (Leuz, 2004; Lang and Sul, 2014). 
I address these potential issues by examining the effect of a plausibly exogenous shock to 
trade secrecy, not relying on measures of product market competition, and by examining 
disclosure methods that arguably have unambiguously low and high proprietary disclosure 
costs with respect to trade secrets.   
I also contribute to the literature that explores the determinants of corporate 
innovation. The majority of studies in this literature use the number of patents granted to 
the firm, and/or the number of citations these patents receive, as a proxy for corporate 
innovation.  However, my findings suggest that a reduction in patenting can also be 
explained by an increased use of trade secrecy, rather than solely by a decrease in 
innovation. My findings support the assertion of Horstmann, MacDonald, and Slivinski 
(1985, pg. 838) that, “patent counts are a flawed measure of innovative activity; firms 
simply do not patent all innovations.”  
Finally, I build on the existing survey evidence on trade secrets by documenting 
large-sample evidence of the determinants and consequences of trade secrecy.  Cohen 
(2010, pg. 192) highlights the importance of understanding trade secrecy, “Thus, the study 
of the use of secrecy has only begun, but is quite important, not only to help us understand 
the determinants of innovative activity and performance, but also for policy. Policy 
discussions on the strength of patents, for example, should proceed in light of firms’ other 
options for protecting their innovations.” The theoretical literature provides a rich set of 
predictions about trade secrets, many with potential policy implications.  To the best of my 
knowledge, these predictions are untested on large samples of publicly traded firms. By 
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developing and validating a new empirical measure of trade secrecy, my work may also 
help future researchers test these predictions. 
I organize the remainder of the paper as follows. I provide background information 
on trade secrets and trade secret laws in Section 2. I describe my research design in Section 
3 and discuss my sample, data sources, and variable measurement in Section 4. I present 
my results in Section 5 and provide concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
Background 
 
2.1 Trade secrets 
The UTSA defines a trade secret as information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.  
Legal and economic scholars often refine this definition by adding the modifier 
“continuous” to economic value to distinguish trade secrets from ephemeral pieces of 
information, such as a secret bid or an undisclosed earnings number (Milgrim, 1967). 
Famous examples of trade secrets include the process for manufacturing WD-40 and 
General Electric’s machine for manufacturing synthetic diamonds. 
9 
 
 Logically, if trade secrecy has costs in the form of increased information 
asymmetry, then trade secrecy must also have benefits to explain why some firms use 
secrecy to protect innovations instead of relying solely on patent protections. One such 
benefit of trade secrecy is avoiding the disclosure costs of patenting.6 The patent office 
dictates that patent applications include a sufficiently detailed disclosure of the innovation 
such that a person skilled in the relevant area could recreate the innovation independently 
of the inventor. Competitors can use the publicly disclosed patent application in 
conjunction with their own research efforts to surpass the patented innovation in quality, 
or to “invent around” the patent.7 
Patenting is also costly because patent protections are limited by the scope of the 
granting government’s judicial authority and by the patent term, whereas the patent 
disclosure is not. Accordingly, patenting will not protect the patentee from international, 
black market, or post-patent term competitors, but will provide these competitors with the 
blueprint for the innovation. Patenting is also potentially costly because patenting reveals 
information about costs and processes to customers and suppliers, and may expose 
patentees to litigation from non-practicing entities. Consistent with patenting representing 
a costly alternative to trade secrecy, the European Union Community Innovation Survey, 
the U.S. Census Bureau and National Science Foundation’s Business Research and 
Development Innovation Survey (BRDIS), and the Carnegie Mellon Survey of Industrial 
                                                          
6 E.g., Horstmann et al., 1985; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Scotchmer, 1991; O’Donoghue, 1998; Anton 
and Yao, 2004; Saidi and Zaldokas, 2017.  
7 Harabi (1995) surveys 358 Swiss R&D experts and finds that “the ability of competitors to 'invent around' 
patented innovations and the perception that patent documents require the 'disclosure of too much 
information' are considered as the most important constraints on the effectiveness of patents.” 
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R&D find that respondents rate secrecy as more valuable than patents for protecting 
innovations and chose not to patent the majority of their innovations.8 
2.2 10-K discussions of trade secrecy 
Regulation S-K requires firms with valuable trade secrets to discuss the risk of trade 
secret misappropriation in the 10-K.  While firms have leeway in determining what 
warrants discussion, trade secrets are often reflected in firms’ product offerings. 
Consequently, the existence of a trade secret is usually public information, while how the 
trade secret works is not (e.g., it was well known that General Electric had a trade secret 
because of the existence of the synthetic diamonds, what was not known was how General 
Electric’s trade secret worked).  Competitors cannot appropriate the trade secret without 
understanding how it works (i.e., it nature). Firms are therefore willing to acknowledge the 
existence of a trade secret in the 10-K, without revealing its nature.  
Firms also receive legal benefits from disclosing the existence of a trade secret. 
Successfully litigating trade secret misappropriation requires plaintiffs to establish that the 
secret was “the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.” Failure to do so will invalidate the plaintiff’s case. Plaintiffs must also 
establish that the trade secret was sufficiently valuable such that the misappropriation 
resulted in economic harm. Failure to do so can result in reduced damage awards and a 
failure to secure an injunction. Firms can submit 10-K disclosures as evidence that the 
secret was sufficiently valuable to merit mention in the annual report, and that the firm was 
taking actions to protect its value.   
                                                          
8 Respectively, Arundel and Kabla, 1998 and Arundel, 2001; Jankowski, 2012; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 
2000. 
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Providing evidence for subsequent trade secret litigation is not the only legal benefit 
of disclosing the existence of trade secrets in the 10-K. Prior to March 16, 2013, the United 
States was one of the few countries that determined patent rights using a first to invent 
legal doctrine and not a first to file legal doctrine. Under a first to invent doctrine, patent 
protections are invalidated if, “the invention was made in this country by another who had 
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it” (35 U.S.C. § 102(g)). Consequently, if a 
competitor reverse engineers a firm’s trade secret and patents it, the trade secret firm can 
still make use of the patented innovation (35 U.S.C. § 273(b)). However, the first party to 
file a patent application has the prima facie right to sole patent protections. To bypass the 
patent, the original inventor must engage in a legal proceeding and establish that they first 
conceived of the invention and took affirmative steps to make the invention publicly 
known. Firms can use the 10-K disclosure of a trade secret as a way to establish first 
conception and public knowledge.   
2.3 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) published the UTSA in 1979, and amended 
it in 1985. The prefatory note to the UTSA states the original motivations behind the act: 
“A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange for 
public disclosure of an invention. If, however, the courts ultimately decide that the Patent 
Office improperly issued a patent, an invention has been disclosed to competitors with no 
corresponding benefit. In view of the substantial number of patents that the courts 
invalidate, many businesses now elect to protect commercially valuable information by 
relying on the state trade secret protection law… 
 “…Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law to 
interstate business, this law has not developed satisfactorily. In the first place, its 
development is uneven. Although there typically are a substantial number of reported 
decisions in states that are commercial centers, this is not the case in less populous and 
more agricultural jurisdictions. Secondly, even in states in which there has been significant 
litigation, there is undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret protection, 
and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” 
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Prior to the UTSA, trade secret civil law was governed by unevenly developed and 
uncodified common law remedies across states. The ULC developed the UTSA to 
harmonize and codify the interstate legal treatment of trade secrets. States that pass the 
UTSA reduce the uncertainty of the legal protections afforded to trade secrets, increase 
obtainable remedies for trade secret violations, and extend the statute of limitations on trade 
secret litigation (e.g., Samuels and Johnson, 1990).  
While the UTSA reduced the uncertainty of the legal protections afforded to trade 
secrets, it did not eliminate all uncertainty. The UTSA’s protections only extend to 
appropriation via “improper means.” Improper is a legal term whose exact definition likely 
varies on a case-by-case basis. However, the UTSA is clear that the term “improper” 
extends beyond illegal activities to include “otherwise lawful conduct which is improper 
under the circumstances; e.g., an airplane overflight used as aerial reconnaissance to 
determine the competitor's plant layout during construction of the plant. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (CA5, 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 1024 
(1970). Because the trade secret can be destroyed through public knowledge, the 
unauthorized disclosure of a trade secret is also a misappropriation.” The UTSA is also 
clear that improper means does not include reverse engineering.  
Despite the name, the UTSA does not have a perfectly uniform effect across states. 
Some states slightly alter the language or provisions of the original UTSA and the state 
common law remedies that existed prior to the UTSA also differ. Consequently, the 
strength of the UTSA relative to the pre-existing common law differs across states. 
Nonetheless, I do not attempt to model the heterogeneous change in enforcement across 
states because doing so would require making subjective judgments about the relative 
13 
 
importance of potentially incomparable effects (e.g., it is unclear how the effect of 
increasing allowable damages from double to treble in one state compares to the effect of 
allowing injunctive relief in another). I instead choose to minimize the number of 
subjective choices I make and model the effect of the UTSA’s passage using a simple 
indicator. I summarize the passage of the UTSA by state and year in Appendix A. 
 
Research Design 
 
3.1 Identifying firms with trade secrets 
3.1.1 Disclosure-based measure of trade secrecy 
 To identify firms with trade secrets, I search all 10-K filings on the SEC’s EDGAR 
database for reference to “trade secrecy” or “trade secret.”9 I create an indicator, Trade 
Secrecy, that equals one in each firm-year that the 10-K includes a reference to either. I list 
several examples in Appendix B. I limit analyses that include Trade Secrecy to the post-
1996 period, because EDGAR electronic filing was not mandatory for all firms until after 
May 5, 1996. I present descriptive statistics for Trade Secrecy in Table 1, Panel A. In 41% 
of sample firm-years Trade Secrecy equals one. The transition probabilities suggest that 
Trade Secrecy is “sticky.” Firms that pursue trade secrecy one year also pursue trade 
secrecy the following year 83% of the time. Firms that do not pursue trade secrecy one year 
pursue trade secrecy the following year only 15% of the time. I tabulate the sample 
prevalence of Trade Secrecy by year in Figure 1 and Trade Secrecy “adoptions” and 
                                                          
9 I use wildcard operators in all text searches to ensure that my searches capture modifications of the search 
words (e.g., trade secret, trade secrets, etc.).  
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cessations” by year in Figure 2. Both figures indicate that trade secrecy changes are not 
concentrated in any particular year.  
Table 1  
Panel A: Disclosure-based measure descriptive statistics 
This Table presents descriptive statistics for my sample. My main sample is constructed from the 
intersection of CRSP and Compustat (accounting and stock price data) for the time period 1980 to 2013. 
Some tests require intersecting the main sample with other datasets. All tests using 10-K filing data are for 
the post-1996 period only, as the electronic filing of financial statements on EDGAR was not mandatory until 
after May 5, 1996. I exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900–4942) due to prevalence of regulation in that industry. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for my disclosure-based measure of trade secrecy, Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for my litigation-based measure of trade secrecy. Panel C reports descriptive statistics 
for the other variables used in the study. 
  
Trade secrets (disclosure measure)  
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Trade Secrecy (% of firm-years) 92,736 41% 
 
Trade Secrecy Migration Matrix: 
   
 
Trade Secrecy = 1  
(t+1) 
Trade Secrecy = 0 
(t+1) 
Trade Secrecy = 1 
(t=0) 
83% 17% 
Trade Secrecy =0 
(t=0) 
15% 85% 
 
FF-48 Industries with the highest prevalence of trade secrecy: 
   
Industry Name: % of firm-years: 
Pharmaceuticals 80%  
Computers 74%  
Measuring & Control Equipment 71%  
Medical Equipment 71%  
Business Services 66%  
Electronic Equipment 64%  
Recreation 53%  
Electrical Equipment 52%  
Machinery 48%  
Rubber & Plastic Products 47%  
   
FF-48 Industries with the lowest prevalence of trade secrecy 
   
Industry Name: % of firm-years: 
Construction 23%  
Beer and Liquor 23%  
Trading 21%  
Coal 20%  
Transportation 17%  
15 
 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 15%  
Real Estate 14%  
Banking 11%  
Metallic & Industrial Metal Mining 10%  
Precious Metals 3%  
 
Figure 1 
This figure presents the percentage of sample firms that pursue trade secrecy each year. 
The percentage of firms for which Trade Secrecy = 1 (year) appears on the y-axis (x-axis).  
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Figure 2 
This figure presents the percentage of sample firms that adopt or cease trade secrecy each 
year. The percentage of firms for which Trade Secrecy changes (year) appears on the y-
axis (x-axis). The dashed red line represents cessations and the solid green line represents 
adoptions. 
 
 I compare my measure to the 2011 BRDIS conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau 
to assess the potential degree of measurement error in the measure. Title 13 of the U.S. 
Code requires firms to respond truthfully to the BRDIS and guarantees the confidentiality 
of their responses. Because the survey is confidential, I cannot directly compare my 
measure to individual responses. However, because the BRDIS is confidential and truthful 
reporting is legally required, the survey results should be an unbiased and accurate 
reflection of the prevalence of trade secrecy.  
The BRDIS is sent to a representative sample of U.S. firms, regardless of their R&D 
spending, size, industry, or public nature. Among surveyed firms with 1,000-4,999 
employees, 28.9% rated trade secrecy as a “very important” form of intellectual property 
protection and 10.3% as a “somewhat important” form of intellectual property protection 
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(the remaining 60.8% rated trade secrecy as “not important”).10 These frequencies are 
similar to the 42% frequency of trade secrecy among my sample firms in 2011 (the same 
year as the survey). 
 I also list the ten Fama-French 48 industries in which firms are most likely to pursue 
trade secrecy, and the ten Fama-French 48 industries in which they are least likely to do 
so, in Table 1, Panel A.11 Firms in seemingly innovative industries are the most likely to 
discuss trade secrecy in the 10-K, while firms in seemingly non-innovative industries are 
the least likely. The industry prevalence of my measure is also similar to the results of the 
2011 BRDIS: surveyed firms in the Computers and Electronic Parts; Petroleum and Coal 
Products; and Chemicals Industries (including drugs) were the most likely to report that 
trade secrets were important, while firms in the Real Estate and Rental Planning; Mining, 
Extraction, and Support; and Finance and Insurance industries were the least likely to 
respond that trade secrets were important.12 
3.1.2 Litigation-based measure of trade secrecy 
 A potential concern with Trade Secrecy is that it is imprecise because it measures 
the presence of trade secrets, but not their value. To address the imprecision of Trade 
Secrecy, I use litigation outcomes to identify information about trade secret values that was 
ex ante unobserved by investors, but that was revealed ex post.  
                                                          
10 I compare my sample to surveyed firms with 1,000 or more employees, to ensure rough equivalence in 
size. Similar results hold for firms with 5,000-9,999 employees (29.1% as very important and 9.5% as 
somewhat important), 10,000-24,999 employees (32.6% and 9.8%), and 25,000+ employees (55.1% and 
15.2%). 
11 I exclude utilities from the sample due to the prevalence of regulation in that industry, which may impede 
or alter the nature of innovation. 
12 Note that the BRDIS uses different industry classifications. 
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 Specifically, I search all 10-K filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database for lawsuit 
keywords (e.g., “lawsuit,” “plaintiff,” “civil suit,” etc.) within 200 words of the phrases 
“trade secret” or “trade secrecy,” but not within 200 words of the phrase “risk factors.” 
This results in over 3,000 potential trade secret lawsuits. I then read the associated 10-K 
disclosures to identify trade secret lawsuits, and augment these lawsuits with the 95 trade 
secret cases tried criminally under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) assembled by 
Searle (2010).13 I search for these court cases on Lexis Nexis and PACER to identify 1) 
the value of the trade secret, 2) the valuation method, 3) the development date of the trade 
secret, 4) the lawsuit dates, and 5) the nature of the trade secret.  
 From this search, I identify 134 trade secret misappropriation cases with all 
necessary information available (751 firm-years). The average firm-year value of these 
trade secrets is $84.15 million, equivalent to 32% of the firm’s market value of equity. 
Importantly, this is the court’s (or settlement) assessment of the value of the trade secret, 
not the total damages or settlement amount. Figure 3 describes the timing of variable 
measurement for my litigation-based measure, Trade Secret $. I use the consumer price 
index to inflation adjust trade secret values from the revelation date to the trade secret 
period (e.g., a trade secret revealed in 2008 but developed in 2001 is inflation adjusted 
from 2008 dollars to 2001 dollars, 2002 dollars, etc.). I remove firm-years after the firm is 
involved in trade secret litigation in all analyses to minimize the risk that my results reflect 
                                                          
13 Available here: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1632. I thank Nicola Searle for 
generously making the data publicly available. The EEA, enacted October 11, 1996, made the theft or 
misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime. However, the EEA did not supplant state common law 
for civil actions. As such, most industrial trade secret cases are tried under state laws. 
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indirect effects of trade secrecy via litigation. I take the natural logarithm of one plus Trade 
Secret $ because I expect the effects of trade secrecy to be proportional. 
Figure 3 
 
This figure presents the timeline of variable measurement for my litigation-based trade 
secrecy measure. Each dash represents the beginning or end of a firm-year. 
 
 
I present descriptive statistics for ln(Trade Secret $) in Table 1, Panel B. The 
ln(Trade Secret $) sample begins in 1997 because it is constructed using information 
gathered from EDGAR. There are 751 firm-years in which the firm has a trade secret that 
is subsequently revealed via misappropriation (i.e., where ln(Trade Secret $) > 0). In 78% 
of these firm-years, Trade Secrecy = 1.14 I also present descriptive statistics on the 
valuation method and the trade secret type in Table 1, Panel B. Due to the small sample of 
subsequently revealed trade secrets I do not examine the industry prevalence of ln(Trade 
Secret $).  
Table 1, continued  
Panel B: Litigation-based measure descriptive statistics 
This Table presents descriptive statistics for my sample. My main sample is constructed from the 
intersection of CRSP and Compustat (accounting and stock price data) for the time period 1980 to 2013. 
                                                          
14 The 22% of firm-years in which Trade Secrecy = 0 largely occur early in the life of the trade secret 
before the trade secret is commercialized and has yet to affect performance. In unreported analyses, I find 
that changes in performance and Trade Secrecy occur simultaneously, changes in R&D spending first 
precede changes in Trade Secrecy by 3-4 years, and changes in redactions occur simultaneously with 
changes in Trade Secrecy. These results suggest that firms discuss trade secrets in the 10-K when the trade 
secret is revealed via changes in performance or in their product offerings (i.e., when the trade secret is 
commercialized).  
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Some tests require intersecting the main sample with other datasets. All tests using 10-K filing data are for 
the post-1996 period only, as the electronic filing of financial statements on EDGAR was not mandatory until 
after May 5, 1996. I exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900–4942) due to prevalence of regulation in that industry. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for my disclosure-based measure of trade secrecy, Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for my litigation-based measure of trade secrecy. Panel C reports descriptive statistics 
for the other variables used in the study. 
  
Trade secrets (litigation measure)  
     
Variable Observations Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
Trade Secret $ (in 1,000,000’s) 58,305 0.37 9.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ln(Trade Secret $) 58,305 0.08 1.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Trade Secret $ (in 1,000,000’s),                                             
  positive subsample 751 84.12 147.63 5.51 31.35 88.10 
ln(Trade Secret $), positive subsample 751 16.92 1.88 15.52 17.26 18.29 
Trade Secrecy, positive subsample 751 78% . .  .  .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3.2 The determinants of trade secrecy 
I begin my empirical analysis by documenting the determinants of my measures of 
trade secrecy. I do so to validate the construct validity of the measures, and because no 
prior non-survey work documents the determinants of trade secrecy. To accomplish these 
goals, I estimate two regressions of the following basic form: 
Trade Secret Measure = β0 + β1UTSAi,t + β2Inevitable Disclosure Doctrinei,t + 
β3Noncompete Enforcement Indexi,t + β4ln(Size)i,t+ β5Leveragei,t + β6Return on 
Trade secret litigation data    
Trade secret type: % of positive firm-years 
Software 36% 
Strategic/Customer 23% 
Method 18% 
Machine 13% 
Formula 11% 
  
Valuation method: % of positive firm-years 
Settlement 29% 
Award 28% 
Damages 22% 
Reasonable Royalty 14% 
Cost 7% 
21 
 
Assetsi,t + β7Market to Booki,t + β8Returni,t + β9σReturnsi,t + β10Loss Indicatori,t 
+ β11Special Itemsi,t + β12Blockholdersi,t + β13R&D Expendituresi,t + β14Missing 
R&D Indicatori,t + IndustryFE + YearFE + εi,t+1                                 (1) 
where i and t index firms and time, respectively. In the first specification, I use Pr[Trade 
Secrecyi,t+1 = 1] as the dependent variables in a Probit regression. In the second 
specification, I use ln(Trade Secret $)i,t+1 as the dependent variable in an OLS regression. 
In all analyses using ln(Trade Secret $) as an independent or dependent variable, I remove 
all firm-years for which Trade Secrecy = 1 to minimize the risk that the control group 
includes firms with trade secrets.15  
I include three variables to capture regulatory shocks that should affect firms’ 
incentives to use trade secrecy. The first is an indicator for whether the firm’s headquarters 
state has passed the UTSA. I predict that firms protected by the UTSA are more likely to 
pursue trade secrecy because the UTSA increased the protections afforded trade secrets. 
The second is an indicator for whether the judiciary of the firm’s headquarters state has 
applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows courts 
to find that a former employee will inevitably reveal any proprietary information they 
learned at their previous place of employment. The third is the noncompete enforceability 
index, which measures the likelihood the state judiciary will enforce a noncompete 
agreement (Garmaise, 2009; Aobdia, 2018).  
                                                          
15 Alternatively, I could include Trade Secrecy as an additional control. However, Trade Secrecy and 
ln(Trade Secret $) are both measures of trade secrecy. Consequently, including one as a control for the 
other introduces a bad control problem. I do not exclude firm-years where Trade Secret Value > 0 from 
regressions with Trade Secrecy as the dependent variable because in almost every firm-year in which this is 
true Trade Secrecy = 1.  
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I predict that firms protected by the inevitable disclosure doctrine or headquartered 
in states characterized by higher values of the noncompete enforcement index are more 
likely to pursue trade secrecy because these regulations reduce the risk that former 
employees will subsequently reveal trade secrets to competitors.16 However, I do not focus 
on these regulations in my differences-in-differences tests because they affect the pursuit 
of trade secrecy through the specific channel of limits on employee mobility. Limits on 
employee mobility may affect firm outcomes through mechanisms other than trade secrecy. 
Consequently, it is not clear that any effect of these shocks is due solely to their effect on 
trade secrecy. 
I include two separate measures of firms’ concerns about priced adverse selection 
in external capital markets. The first measure is the firm’s size as measured by the natural 
logarithm of its market value of equity. Larger firms typically have a lower cost of capital, 
are less affected by declines in the quality of their information environment, and may also 
have more internal resources (e.g., Archer and Faerber, 1966; Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2013). The results of the 2011 BRDIS also suggest that larger firms, as measured by 
number of employees, are more likely to use trade secrecy. The second measure is the 
firm’s leverage, as measured by long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. 
Highly levered firms are more likely to be capital constrained and more concerned about 
the adverse selection costs of trade secrecy as a result (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). I 
predict that firms concerned about priced adverse selection in external capital markets will 
                                                          
16 Consistent with employee mobility being costly for firms with trade secrets, Erkens (2011) finds that 
R&D intensive firms in industries that rely on trade secrecy are more likely to use time-vested stock-based 
pay.  
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be less likely to use trade secrecy because of the information asymmetry effects of doing 
so (Glaeser, Michels, and Verrecchia, 2017). 
I include the firm’s annual R&D expenditures, scaled by total assets, to capture 
observable investments in innovation.17 Following prior work, I replace missing values of 
R&D with zeroes (see Koh and Reeb, 2015 for a review of how prior work handles missing 
values of R&D). I predict that trade secrecy will be positively related to R&D expenditures, 
as trade secrecy is used to protect innovations. The results of the 2011 BRDIS also suggest 
that firms with R&D spending are more likely to rely on trade secrecy. Following Koh and 
Reeb (2015), I include an indicator for whether data on a firm’s R&D expenditures is 
missing. I predict that firms with trade secrets will report their R&D expenditures, because 
firms with trade secrets must credibly communicate to investors that they have invested in 
innovation. I also include the firm’s market to book ratio and predict that it will be 
positively related to trade secrecy, as trade secrets are intangible assets. 
I include a variety of measures of firm performance (e.g., stock returns, return on 
assets, and an indicator for when the firm’s net income is negative). I predict that historical 
firm performance will be negatively related to pursuing trade secrecy because poorly 
performing firms may innovate to improve their competitive position and choose to protect 
any resulting innovations with trade secrecy. I also include the number of blockholders, 
measured as the number of shareholders listed on Thomson Reuters who hold 5% or more 
of the firm’s equity. I predict that the presence of blockholders will be positively related to 
pursuing trade secrecy, for two reasons. First, managers may be able to reduce the 
                                                          
17 Hall and Ziedonis (2001) show that contemporaneous annual R&D expenditures parsimoniously measure 
the effect of historical R&D spending (i.e., the effect of R&D stocks).  
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information asymmetry costs of pursuing trade secrecy by credibly informing blockholders 
privately about the nature of trade secrets. Second, blockholders are sophisticated investors 
who can better discern the value of a trade secret, potentially reducing the expected 
information asymmetry costs of pursuing trade secrecy.  
Finally, I follow prior literature on corporate transparency and disclosure and 
include special items scaled by total assets and the standard deviation of monthly returns 
as additional controls (e.g., Guay et al., 2016). I include year fixed effects to control for 
common macroeconomic shocks and time trends. I do not make predictions about the sign 
of the coefficients on these variables. In my cross-sectional determinants regression I 
include industry indicators to control for the differing industry prevalence of trade secrecy. 
In subsequent specifications, I replace the industry indicators with firm indicators to isolate 
the effects of trade secrecy to within-firm variation. I base my inferences on standard errors 
clustered by year and headquarters state. 
3.3 The effects of trade secrecy 
In this section, I describe how I examine the effects of trade secrecy. Throughout 
my analyses, I draw inferences from several separate, but complementary, empirical 
specifications. The first examines changes in outcomes that occur after a firm’s reliance on 
trade secrecy changes: 
Dependent Variablei,t+1 = β0 + β1Trade Secrecy Measurei,t + γ'Xi,t + FirmFE + 
YearFE + εi,t                         (2) 
I estimate Eq. (2) separately for both measures of trade secrecy (i.e., Trade Secrecy and 
ln(Trade Secret $)). The firm fixed effects in Eq. (2) control for the effect of any time-
invariant aspects of the firm. To control for time-varying observable aspects of the firm, I 
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include the vector Xi,t, which includes the determinants from Eq. (1). Consequently, I 
control for a great many alternative explanations for a relation between trade secrecy and 
firm outcomes. Nonetheless, the validity of my inferences may be threatened if, for 
example, firms are more likely to pursue trade secrecy when they anticipate changes in the 
dependent variable (i.e., selection).  
To reduce concerns about selection, I also examine changes in outcomes after the 
passage of the UTSA by the firm’s headquarters state. Specifically, I estimate the following 
generalized differences-in-differences specification: 
Dependent Variablei,t+1 = β0 + β1UTSAi,t + γ'Xi,t + FirmFE + YearFE + εi,t    (3) 
The coefficient estimate on UTSA captures the causal effect of trade secrecy on affected 
firms as long as the differences-in-differences assumptions are satisfied (Blundell and Dias, 
2009).  
The first differences-in-differences assumption is the parallel trends assumption 
(i.e., the assumption that the outcome for firms affected by the passage of the UTSA would 
have been the same as the outcome for unaffected firms, had they not been affected by the 
UTSA). The parallel trends assumption is satisfied as long as the passage of the UTSA was 
otherwise exogenous with respect to changes in the outcomes that I examine. Because 
outcomes in the absence of treatment are unobservable, the parallel trends assumption is 
inherently untestable. However, Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996) present evidence that the 
adoption of uniform laws, including the UTSA, is not driven by lobbying interests, but 
instead by the efforts of the ULC. Their finding suggests that the adoption of the UTSA 
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was largely exogenous with respect to the outcomes of firms headquartered in adopting 
states.18  
The second differences-in-differences assumption is the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (“SUTVA”). The SUTVA requires that the treatment status of one firm does 
not affect the potential outcomes of other firms. The SUTVA may be violated in my 
patenting tests because trade secrecy causes less disclosure of innovative activity via the 
patenting process. This reduced disclosure could lead to a reduction in the patenting rates 
of firms otherwise unaffected by the UTSA if patent disclosures cause innovative spillovers 
(e.g., Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenan, 2013). Consequently, such a violation of 
SUTVA would work against documenting a negative effect of trade secrecy on patenting 
activity. 
The final differences-in-differences assumption is the perfect compliance 
assumption. Perfect compliance requires that no firms received the treatment in the pre-
treatment period and that all firms in the treatment group—and only those firms—received 
the treatment in the post-treatment period. The perfect compliance assumption is violated 
in the UTSA setting because some firms in the control group adopt trade secrecy, some 
firms in the treatment group adopt trade secrecy prior to the passage of the UTSA, and 
some firms in the treatment group do not adopt trade secrecy.19 However, a violation of the 
perfect compliance assumption does not prevent causal inference (e.g., Angrist et al., 1996; 
Blundell and Dias, 2009).  
                                                          
18 I also find no evidence that firms relocate their headquarters to states that have passed the UTSA (e.g., 
the correlation between changes in headquarters states and changes in UTSA protection is -0.0072). 
19 Few quasi-natural experiments feature perfect compliance. For example, individuals may flee the country 
to avoid a random military draft or willingly enlist prior to a random draft (Angrist et al., 1996).  
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When compliance is imperfect, the monotonicity assumption replaces the perfect 
compliance assumption (e.g., Angrist et al., 1996; Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006). 
The monotonicity assumption is the assumption that treatment has a monotone effect on 
the behavior of affected firms (i.e., that there are no “defiers”). The monotonicity 
assumption would be violated in the UTSA setting if some affected firms cease trade 
secrecy, but would not have ceased trade secrecy in the absence of the UTSA. It is unlikely 
the monotonicity assumption is violated because the UTSA increased the protections 
afforded trade secrecy, and it is unlikely that increased protections would cause a firm to 
cease trade secrecy.20  
Because compliance with the UTSA was imperfect, Eq. (4) identifies the LATE of 
“marginal adopters.” Marginal adopters are the firms that would not have pursued trade 
secrecy absent the additional protection of the UTSA. The outcomes of firms that pursue 
trade secrecy regardless of whether they are protected by the UTSA (i.e., “always 
adopters”) and those that never pursue trade secrecy (i.e., “never adopters”) are differenced 
out by the firm and year fixed effects. Therefore, the coefficient estimate on UTSA in Eq. 
(4) is a weighted average of zero effect for never adopters and always adopters, and the 
causal effect on marginal adopters (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Armstrong, Glaeser, and 
Huang, 2017). 
I examine the effect of trade secrecy on patenting activity, proprietary disclosure, 
nonproprietary disclosure, and corporate transparency. I measure patenting activity using 
                                                          
20 Although it is unlikely that the monotonicity assumption is violated in my setting, any violation of the 
monotonicity assumption will attenuate estimates so long as the effects of adopting and ceasing trade 
secrecy are symmetric (e.g., Heckman, et al., 2006). 
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the number of patents filed by the firm and the number of subsequent citations the firm 
receives on patents filed. I take the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents 
filed in a year (Patents Filed), and of the citations received on those patents (Patent 
Citations) because I follow prior literature and assume that common shocks to patenting 
effect patenting rates proportionally.    
To measure proprietary disclosure, I search the firm’s 10-K filing for redaction 
keywords (e.g., "confidential treatment," "redacted," "CT order," etc.) Redactions are an 
attractive measure of (inverse) proprietary disclosure in my setting because it is likely that 
managers use redactions to protect information that could reveal a trade secret. For 
example, one of the few legal justifications the SEC will accept for redacting portions of a 
required filing is a desire to protect trade secrets (17 CFR 200.80(b)(4)). Following 
Verrecchia and Weber (2006), I use an indicator for whether the firm redacts portions of 
its 10-K as an inverse measure proprietary disclosure. 
I measure nonproprietary disclosure using the number of management earnings 
forecasts issued during the twelve months after the filing of the 10-K. Manager forecasts 
are an attractive measure of nonproprietary disclosure in my setting because it is unlikely 
that forecasts can reveal proprietary information about a trade secret, and because forecasts 
are one of the most significant disclosure choices a manager can make (see Hirst, Koonce, 
and Venkataraman, 2008 for a review).21 Following prior work, I use the natural logarithm 
of one plus the number of forecasts (Forecast Frequency) and an indicator that takes the 
                                                          
21 Of course, manager forecasts can be proprietary with respect to other types of information (e.g., Huang et 
al., 2016).  
29 
 
value one if the manager releases at least one forecast in the subsequent year (Guider) (e.g., 
Guay et al, 2016). 
 Finally, I measure corporate transparency using information asymmetry between 
investors and managers, and among investors. To measure information asymmetry between 
investors and managers I use the absolute value of analyst forecast errors and analyst 
forecast dispersion. Following prior work, I take the natural logarithm of one plus both 
variables. When using analyst dispersion and analyst error as dependent variables, I follow 
prior work and include the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following 
the firm as an additional control. To measure information asymmetry among investors, I 
use both the average bid-ask spread and the average of the Amihud (2002) measure of 
illiquidity.  
3.4 The parallel trends assumption 
 To ensure that my differences-in-differences results are unexplained by pre-
existing differential trends, I estimate the following differences-in-differences regression: 
Dependent Variablei,t+1 = β0 + β1UTSAi,t=-1,-2,-3 + β2UTSAi,t=0 + β3UTSAi,t=1,2,3 +  
β4UTSAi,t>3 + γ'Xi,t + FirmFE + YearFE + εi,t           (4) 
Eq. (4) is identical to Eq. (3), except that I include the variable UTSAi,t=-1,-2,-3 and 
separate UTSA into three variables based on the years since the UTSA’s passage. A 
significant coefficient estimate on UTSAi,t=-1,-2,-3  suggests that firms affected by the 
UTSA were trending differently prior to the law’s passage. I separate UTSA into three 
variables based on the time since the law’s passage to document whether the effect of the 
UTSA is gradual or immediate. 
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Data and Sample Descriptives 
 
I examine three regulations that affect firms based on their headquarters state: the 
passage of the UTSA, the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and the 
components of the noncompete enforcement index (Garmaise, 2009).22 To correct 
Compustat’s headquarters data for errors, I use the Exhibit-21 headquarters data first 
described in Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2013) and the hand collected headquarters 
data first described in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015).23  
I obtain data on patents and patent citations from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and 
Stoffman (2016). The authors download the entire history of U.S. patent documents from 
the Google Patents database and match the patent assignee to CRSP. Following prior work, 
I use the patent’s file date instead of its grant date, as there is typically at least a year’s lag 
between file date and grant date. I address the truncation bias in patent data by including 
fixed effects in all tests and only including observations that occur prior to the last three 
years of the patent database (Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2001).24 Consequently, my tests on 
patenting activity are limited to the 1980-2007 period, because the patent database ends in 
2010. 
                                                          
22 Most trade secret cases are tried based on the law of the plaintiff’s “principle place of business,” which is 
usually interpreted as the firms’ headquarters (e.g., Almeling, Snyder, Sapoznikow, and McCollum, 2010).  
23 The SEC EDGAR header data is available on Scott Dyreng’s website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/Home/data-and-code/EX21-Dataset. The Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2015) data was provided by request. In cases where the two disagree, I use the SEC EDGAR header data. I 
thank the authors of both studies for making their data publicly available. 
24 Patent data involves truncation bias because citations are a forward-looking measure, and because patents 
do not appear in the database until they are granted (e.g., a patent granted in the last year of the database 
will have received very few citations and some filed patents that are in process in the year the database ends 
will not yet appear because they have yet to be granted). 
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I require non-missing data for control variables from the Compustat and CRSP 
databases in all tests. I obtain data on analyst following and analyst forecasts properties 
from I/B/E/S. Data on manager earnings guidance comes from the I/B/E/S guidance 
database, which begins in 1995. My text search of 10-Ks on EDGAR identifies 17% of 10-
K filings as redacted, nearly matching the 16% rate of 10-K redaction documented by 
Verrecchia and Weber (2006) in their hand collected sample. My tests on the propensity to 
redact the 10-K begin in 1997 because I limit them to the period after the electronic filing 
of 10-Ks became mandatory.  
Table 1, continued  
Panel C: Other descriptive statistics 
This Table presents descriptive statistics for my sample. My main sample is constructed from the 
intersection of CRSP and Compustat (accounting and stock price data) for the time period 1980 to 2013. 
Some tests require intersecting the main sample with other datasets. All tests using 10-K filing data are for 
the post-1996 period only, as the electronic filing of financial statements on EDGAR was not mandatory until 
after May 5, 1996. I exclude utilities (SIC codes 4900–4942) due to prevalence of regulation in that industry. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for my disclosure-based measure of trade secrecy, Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for my litigation-based measure of trade secrecy. Panel C reports descriptive statistics 
for the other variables used in the study. 
 
Other firm characteristics       
Variable Observations Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
       
Regulatory variables:             
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine  (% of firm-
years) 176,343 42% . . . . 
Noncompete Enforcement Index 176,343 3.47 2.38 1.00 4.00 5.00 
UTSA (% of firm-years) 176,343 50% . . . . 
       
Compustat & CRSP variables:       
Amihud Illiquidity 107,746 1.56 5.33 0.01 0.08 0.63 
Bid-Ask Spread 107,746 2.73 3.53 0.30 1.47 3.63 
Leverage 176,343 0.23 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.36 
ln(Size) 176,343 4.92 2.25 3.29 4.79 6.45 
Loss (% of firm-years) 176,343 34% . . . . 
Market to Book 176,343 1.90 1.74 1.01 1.30 2.02 
Missing R&D  (% of firm-years) 176,343 49% . . . . 
R&D 176,343 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Return on Assets 176,343 -0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.02 0.07 
Returns 176,343 0.13 0.64 -0.26 0.03 0.35 
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Special Items 176,343 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
σReturns 176,343 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.18 
       
Thomson-Reuters variables:       
Blockholders 176,343 0.99 1.42 0.00 0.00 2.00 
       
Google Patents variables:       
ln(Patent Citations) 141,571 0.44 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ln(Patents Filed) 141,571 0.82 1.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
I/B/E/S  variables:       
Guider (% of firm-years) 99,139 33% . . . . 
ln(Analyst Dispersion) 53,084 0.47 0.58 0.11 0.25 0.58 
ln(Analyst Error) 64,127 0.76 0.86 0.15 0.43 1.06 
ln(Analysts) 64,127 1.46 0.95 0.69 1.39 2.20 
ln(Forecast Frequency) 99,139 0.62 0.98 0.00 0.00 1.10 
       
EDGAR variables:       
Redacted 10-K (% of firm-years) 92,736 17% . . . . 
 
 
Results 
 
5.1 Determinants of trade secrecy 
 I present the results of estimating Eq. (1), which models my measures of trade 
secrecy as a function of determinants, in Table 2. I present the results when using Trade 
Secrecy as the dependent variable in a Probit regression in column (1), and when using 
ln(Trade Secret $) as the dependent variable in an OLS regression in column (2). I list the 
sign of my predictions for each variable in this table because I make a large number of 
predictions. I first interpret the predicted probabilities from the Probit model with all 
variables evaluated at their sample means.  
Table 2  
Determinants of trade secrecy 
Column (1) of this table presents a Probit regression of my disclosure-based measure of trade secrecy, 
Trade Secrecy, as a function of cross-sectional determinants. Column (2) presents an OLS regression of my 
litigation-based measure of trade secret values, ln(Trade Secret $), as a function of cross-sectional 
determinants. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
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0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. I 
list my predictions for the sign of coefficients, where applicable.  
Variable:   Trade Secrecy ln(Trade Secret $) 
  Prediction: (1) (2) 
    
UTSA + 0.569*** 0.366*** 
  (7.93) (4.35) 
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine + 0.358*** 0.252*** 
  (8.77) (4.04) 
Noncompete Enforcement Index + 0.004 -0.027 
  (0.21) (-1.47) 
ln(Size) + 0.041*** 0.078*** 
  (6.93) (3.12) 
Leverage - -0.275*** -0.135** 
  (-4.73) (-2.29) 
Return on Assets - 0.035 0.376 
  (0.38) (1.18) 
Market to Book + 0.045*** -0.002 
  (4.47) (-0.13) 
Returns - -0.070*** -0.039** 
  (-8.59) (-1.99) 
σReturns ? 1.941*** 0.597*** 
  (14.35) (3.04) 
Loss + 0.187*** 0.052 
  (5.84) (0.81) 
Special Items ? -0.493*** -0.748 
  (-3.53) (-1.40) 
Blockholders + 0.054*** 0.018 
  (11.04) (1.53) 
R&D + 2.769*** 4.521* 
  (9.35) (1.70) 
Missing R&D - -0.278*** -0.226** 
  (-6.02) (-2.30) 
    
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  92,736 50,831 
Pseudo R2  0.268 . 
Adjusted R2   . 0.056 
 
The results suggest that firms concerned about priced adverse selection in external 
capital markets avoid trade secrecy. In particular, the model predicts that a one standard 
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deviation increase in firm leverage results in a 2.3 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that the firm pursues trade secrecy (z-statistic of -4.73). Similarly, the model 
predicts that a one standard deviation increase in firm size results in a 3.6 percentage point 
increase in the probability that the firm pursues trade secrecy (z-statistic of 6.93).  
 I find that two of the three regulatory shocks I examine are arguably the largest 
determinants of pursuing trade secrecy. The model predicts that firms protected by the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine are 16.4 percentage points more likely to pursue trade 
secrecy than unprotected firms (z-statistic of 8.77). The effect of the UTSA is even larger 
– the model predicts that firms protected by the UTSA are 21.8 percentage points more 
likely to pursue trade secrecy than unprotected firms (z-statistic of 7.93). The third 
regulatory shock I examine, the noncompete enforcement index, is also positively related 
to the pursuit of trade secrecy, although the relation is far from statistically significant (z-
statistic of only 0.21).  
Firms with more intangible assets, as measured by R&D expenditures and market 
to book ratios, appear more likely to pursue trade secrecy. In particular, the results suggest 
that a one standard deviation increase in R&D expenditures (market to book ratios) is 
associated with a 9.9 (3.1) percentage point increase in the probability that the firm pursues 
trade secrecy (z-statistics of 9.35 and 4.47, respectively). The model predicts that firms that 
do not report their R&D expenditures are 10.8 percentage points less likely to pursue trade 
secrecy, consistent with firms with trade secrets having to credibly communicate their 
investments in innovation, t (z-statistic of -6.02).  
The presence of blockholders is also statistically significantly related to the pursuit 
of trade secrecy. The model predicts that a one standard deviation increase in the number 
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of blockholders results in a 2.9 percentage point increase in the probability that the firm 
pursues trade secrecy (z-statistic of 11.26). This result is consistent with concentrated 
ownership facilitating trade secrecy, potentially because managers can privately 
communicate the nature of trade secrets to select shareholders, or because blockholders are 
sophisticated investors who can better discern the value of a trade secret.  
I also find that poorly performing firms are more likely to pursue trade secrecy, 
possibly for manager agency reasons or because they must innovate to improve their 
competitive position. Specifically, firms with a prior accounting loss are 13.4 percentage 
points more likely to pursue trade secrecy (z-statistics 5.84). Similarly, a one standard 
deviation increase in returns is associated with a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the 
probability the firm pursues trade secrecy (z-statistic of -8.59). My third measure of firm 
performance, return on assets, is not statistically significantly related to the pursuit of trade 
secrecy (z-statistic of 0.38).  
The results in column (2) when using ln(Trade Secret $) as the dependent variable 
are similar to the results in column (1) when using Trade Secrecy, although less statistically 
significant (possibly because of the smaller sample size). Specifically, the results in column 
(2) suggest that firms protected by the UTSA have trade secrets worth 44.2% more, and 
firms protected by the inevitable disclosure doctrine have trade secrets worth 28.7% more 
(t-statistics of 4.35 and 4.04, respectively).25 The results in column (2) also suggest that the 
elasticity of trade secret value to firm size is 0.08%, and that a one standard deviation 
increase in firm leverage is associated with trade secrets worth 9.9% less (t-statistics of 
                                                          
25 The coefficient estimates of 0.366 and 0.252 refer to the natural logarithm of trade secret values, so the 
laws are associated with a exp(0.366) -1 = 44.2% and exp(0.252)-1 = 28.7% greater value of trade secrets. 
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3.12 and -2.29, respectively). The results also suggest that a one standard deviation increase 
in R&D spending is associated with trade secrets worth 50.2% more, and that firms that do 
not report their R&D expenditures have trade secrets worth 20.2% less (t-statistics of 1.70 
and -2.30, respectively). Finally, the results suggest that a one standard deviation increase 
in firm returns is associated with trade secrets worth 2.5% less (t-statistics of -1.99). 
  Collectively, I find evidence in Table 2 that my measures of trade secrecy are 
positively related to observable investments in innovation and the legal predictions 
afforded trade secrets, suggesting that the measures identify firms with trade secrets. I also 
find that the measures are negatively related to size and leverage, consistent with my 
prediction that smaller firms and more levered firms will avoid trade secrecy because of 
greater concerns about the cost of information asymmetry. My results that the prevalence 
of trade secrecy is increasing in firms’ R&D expenditures and size are also consistent with 
the results of the BRDIS.  
5.2 Trade secrecy and patenting  
 I present the results of estimating Eqs. (2) and (3) with my measures of patenting 
activity as dependent variables in Table 3. The results in column (1) suggest that the 
passage of the UTSA caused a 1.3% decline in relative average patent filings by affected 
firms (t-statistic of -1.94). The results in column (2) suggest that firms that adopt trade 
secrecy, as measured by 10-K discussions, also experience a 2.1% decline in relative 
average patent filings (t-statistic of -2.40). In contrast, the results in column (3) suggest 
there is no statistically significant relation between changes in patent filings and changes 
in trade secret values, as measured by ln(Trade Secret $). However, the results in column 
(6) suggest that the elasticity of patent citations with respect to ln(Trade Secret $) is -0.04% 
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(t-statistic of -2.94). Similarly, the results in column (5) suggest that firms that adopt trade 
secrecy, as measured by 10-K discussions, experience a 6.5% decline in relative patent 
citations (t-statistic of -2.68). Finally, there is no evidence of a statistically significant 
relation between the passage of the UTSA and changes in patent citations in column (4). 
In total, the results in Table 3 suggest that trade secrecy causes a decline in patenting 
activity and suggests the two methods of protecting innovations are substitutes. 
Table 3  
Trade secrecy and patenting 
This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of patenting activity as a function of the 
UTSA and my measures of trade secrecy. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all columns. All 
variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. 
Variable: ln(Patents Filed)   ln(Patent Citations) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
UTSA -0.013* . .  -0.004 . . 
 (-1.94) . .  (-0.15) . . 
Trade Secrecy . -0.021** .  . -0.067
*** . 
 . (-2.40) .  . (-2.68) . 
ln(Trade Secret $) . . -0.006  . . -0.037
*** 
 . . (-0.74)  . . (-2.94) 
Inevitable Disclosure  -0.031 -0.031** -0.018***  -0.061 -0.066 -0.048 
  Doctrine (-1.60) (-2.36) (-2.87)  (-1.60) (-0.91) (-0.82) 
Noncompete Enforcement  -0.000 0.002 0.005*  -0.007 0.001 0.012 
  Index (-0.05) (0.42) (1.84)  (-0.75) (0.12) (1.53) 
ln(Size) 0.097*** 0.077*** 0.041***  0.151
*** 0.111*** 0.090*** 
 (5.99) (5.28) (7.04)  (9.05) (4.22) (6.89) 
Leverage -0.007 -0.007 0.016  -0.061
* -0.050 0.124* 
 (-0.49) (-0.27) (0.55)  (-1.70) (-0.74) (1.74) 
Return on Assets -0.001 0.014 -0.007  0.068
* 0.118* -0.031 
 (-0.06) (0.66) (-0.31)  (1.89) (1.77) (-0.47) 
Market to Book -0.015*** 0.000 -0.005  -0.019
** 0.032*** 0.006 
 (-3.61) (0.11) (-0.93)  (-2.22) (3.62) (0.60) 
Returns -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.014***  -0.033
** -0.061** -0.035*** 
 (-3.65) (-3.12) (-2.87)  (-2.45) (-2.15) (-3.74) 
σReturns 0.121** 0.160 0.034  0.182 0.463
* 0.163*** 
 (2.37) (1.63) (0.86)  (1.62) (1.67) (3.42) 
Loss 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.003  0.045
*** 0.047*** 0.011 
 (3.23) (4.04) (0.43)  (4.07) (3.77) (1.00) 
Special Items 0.005 0.056* 0.010  0.001 -0.105 0.012 
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 (0.21) (1.83) (0.12)  (0.01) (-1.21) (0.09) 
Blockholders -0.001 -0.003 0.000  -0.004 -0.006 0.003 
 (-0.57) (-0.79) (0.12)  (-0.84) (-1.07) (0.98) 
R&D 0.361*** 0.202** 0.179  0.921
*** 0.642** 0.403 
 (4.69) (2.27) (0.76)  (4.79) (2.42) (0.43) 
Missing R&D -0.038*** -0.037 -0.008  -0.078
*** -0.064 -0.007 
 (-2.99) (-1.47) (-0.22)  (-3.24) (-1.39) (-0.11) 
        
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 141,571 60,292 43,510  141,571 60,292 43,510 
Adjusted R2 0.848 0.888 0.917   0.769 0.795 0.855 
 
5.3 Trade secrecy and proprietary disclosure 
I present the results of estimating Eqs. (2) and (3) with my measure of proprietary 
disclosure as dependent variables in Table 4. The results in column (1) suggest that the 
passage of the UTSA caused a 2.7 percentage point relative increase in the probability that 
the managers of affected firms redact portions of the 10-K (t-statistic of 2.29). The results 
in column (2) suggest that firms that adopt trade secrecy, as measured by 10-K discussions, 
also experience a 2.1 percentage point relative increase in the probability that the manager 
redacts portions of the 10-K (t-statistic of 5.03). Finally, the results in column (3) suggest 
that a doubling of trade secret values results in a 0.4 percentage point increase in the 
probability that the manager redacts portions of the 10-K (t-statistic of 1.86). These effects 
represent 15.9%, 12.9%, and 2.6% of the sample average, respectively, suggesting they are 
economically significant.26 I conclude that trade secrecy causes a decline in proprietary 
disclosure, consistent with the arguments of Verrecchia (1983). 
                                                          
26 A potential concern with these results is that I define Redacted 10-K using a text search. An alternative is 
to use confidential treatment order forms (CTOFs) from the EDGAR database to measure redactions. While 
this method is likely more accurate than a text search, the resulting tests are less powerful because CTOFs 
are not available on EDGAR until 2009. Nonetheless, I examine the robustness of my inferences to using 
the count of CTOFs filed by the firm in a given year as the dependent variable in Eqs. (2) and (3). I find a 
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Table 4 
Trade secrecy and proprietary disclosure 
       This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of 10-K redaction as a function of the UTSA 
and my measures of trade secrecy. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all columns. All variables are 
as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by 
headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–
tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. 
 
Variable: Redacted 10-K 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
UTSA 0.027** . . 
 (2.29) . . 
Trade Secrecy . 0.022*** . 
 . (5.03) . 
ln(Trade Secret $) . . 0.004* 
 . . (1.86) 
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 0.006 0.001 0.002 
 (0.71) (0.09) (0.47) 
Noncompete Enforcement Index -0.004* -0.003 0.001 
 (-1.71) (-1.12) (0.21) 
ln(Size) 0.003 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.92) (0.89) (-0.01) 
Leverage 0.009 0.007 0.011 
 (0.63) (0.48) (0.58) 
Return on Assets -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 
 (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.72) 
Market to Book -0.002 -0.002 -0.004** 
 (-1.57) (-1.26) (-1.97) 
Returns 0.003 0.002 0.004** 
 (1.64) (1.40) (1.98) 
σReturns 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.033 
 (3.38) (3.32) (1.62) 
Loss 0.002 0.002 0.006** 
 (0.77) (0.83) (2.25) 
Special Items -0.036 -0.036 0.045 
 (-0.70) (-0.71) (1.04) 
Blockholders 0.003* 0.002 0.002 
 (1.74) (1.61) (1.24) 
R&D 0.053 0.049 0.104 
                                                          
positive relation between changes in this alternative measure of redactions and changes in Trade Secrecy, 
although this relation is statistically insignificant at conventional levels (coefficient estimate of 0.01, t-
statistic of 1.02). However, I find a positive and statistically significant relation between the passage of the 
UTSA and changes in this alternative measure of redactions (coefficient estimate of 0.02, t-statistic of 
2.13). The relation between changes in ln(Trade Secret $) and changes in this alternative measure of 
redactions is very low power (coefficient estimate <0.00, t-statistic of -0.14, with large standard errors). 
Using CTOFs to measure the “true” rate of redactions suggests Redacted 10-K has a type I error rate of 
15% and a type II error rate of 23%. 
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 (1.18) (1.10) (1.08) 
Missing R&D -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 
 (-1.05) (-1.05) (-0.57) 
    
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 92,736 92,736 58,305 
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.669 0.657 
 
5.4 Trade secrecy and nonproprietary disclosure 
I present the results of estimating Eqs. (2) and (3) with my measures of 
nonproprietary disclosure as dependent variables in Table 5. The results in column (1) 
suggest that the passage of the UTSA caused a 2.4 percentage point relative increase in the 
probability that the managers of affected firms initiate guidance (t-statistic of 3.47). The 
results in column (2) suggest that firms that adopt trade secrecy, as measured by 10-K 
discussions, experience a 1.3 percentage point relative increase in the probability that the 
manager initiates guidance (t-statistic of 2.99). However, there is no evidence in column 
(3) of a statistically significant relation between changes in trade secret values, as measured 
by ex post litigation outcomes, and changes in the probability that the manager initiates 
guidance. 
Table 5 
Trade secrecy and nonproprietary disclosure 
      This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of manager forecasting activity as a function 
of the UTSA and my measures of trade secrecy. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all columns. All 
variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors 
clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. 
 
Variable: Guider   ln(Forecast Frequency) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
UTSA 0.024*** . .  0.066
*** . . 
 (3.47) . .  (3.15) . . 
Trade Secrecy . 0.013*** .  . 0.054
*** . 
 . (2.99) .  . (3.20) . 
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ln(Trade Secret $) . . -0.001  . . 0.015
*** 
 . . (-0.58)  . . (2.63) 
Inevitable Disclosure  0.015** 0.006 0.002  0.029
** 0.010 0.010 
  Doctrine (2.00) (0.69) (0.21)  (2.01) (0.86) (0.31) 
Noncompete Enforcement  0.001 0.003* 0.005*  0.001 0.005
** 0.009 
  Index (0.62) (1.81) (1.81)  (0.20) (2.38) (1.47) 
ln(Size) 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077***  0.158*** 0.159
*** 0.152*** 
 (17.32) (13.50) (10.88)  (17.40) (14.81) (12.13) 
Leverage 0.095*** 0.103*** 0.098***  0.216
*** 0.231*** 0.161*** 
 (7.30) (7.64) (4.57)  (6.03) (6.09) (2.73) 
Return on Assets 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.035*  0.058 0.083
* 0.019 
 (3.13) (3.05) (1.77)  (1.52) (1.87) (0.43) 
Market to Book -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015***  -0.041
*** -0.042*** -0.041*** 
 (-5.22) (-4.69) (-3.20)  (-5.86) (-5.35) (-3.91) 
Returns -0.016** -0.014* -0.014**  -0.010 -0.006 -0.017 
 (-2.34) (-1.85) (-2.25)  (-0.73) (-0.43) (-1.56) 
σReturns -0.017 -0.027 -0.008  -0.305
*** -0.342*** -0.161** 
 (-0.64) (-0.90) (-0.20)  (-3.64) (-3.73) (-2.05) 
Loss -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.022***  -0.082
*** -0.091*** -0.058*** 
 (-6.17) (-6.08) (-4.71)  (-9.19) (-10.37) (-6.84) 
Special Items -0.042 -0.041 -0.080  -0.040 -0.043 -0.123 
 (-1.02) (-0.91) (-1.38)  (-0.45) (-0.42) (-1.08) 
Blockholders 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005**  0.024
*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 
 (4.25) (2.93) (2.56)  (5.13) (3.72) (2.59) 
R&D 0.027 0.043 0.013  0.082 0.140 0.017 
 (0.62) (0.87) (0.12)  (0.98) (1.52) (0.08) 
Missing R&D -0.004 0.008 0.005  -0.018 0.006 0.004 
 (-0.29) (0.52) (0.24)  (-0.59) (0.22) (0.10) 
        
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 99,139 85,959 58,305  99,139 85,959 58,305 
Adjusted R2 0.634 0.654 0.654   0.719 0.736 0.725 
 
I repeat the sequence in columns (4) through (6) with the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of forecasts issued by the manager as the dependent variable. The results 
in column (4) suggest that the passage of the UTSA caused a 6.8% increase in relative 
average forecasting activity by the managers of affected firms (t-statistic of 3.15). The 
results in column (5) suggest that firms that adopt trade secrecy, as measured by 10-K 
discussions, experience a 5.5% increase in relative average forecasting activity (t-statistic 
of 3.20). Finally, in contrast to the results in column (3), there is a statistically significant 
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relation between changes in trade secret values, as measured by ex post litigation outcomes, 
and changes in forecasting activity. In particular, the results suggest that the elasticity of 
forecasting activity with respect to ln(Trade Secret $) is 0.02% (t-statistic of 2.63). In total, 
the results in Table 5 suggest that firms substitute nonproprietary disclosure for proprietary 
disclosure when relying on trade secrecy. 
5.5 Trade secrecy and information asymmetry between managers and investors 
 I present the results of estimating Eqs. (2) and (3) with my measures of information 
asymmetry between investors and managers as dependent variables in Table 6. The results 
in column (1) suggests that the passage of the UTSA caused a 5.3% increase in the relative 
average of absolute analyst forecast errors for affected firms (t-statistic of 2.35). The results 
in column (2) suggest that firms that adopt trade secrecy, as measured by 10-K discussions, 
experience a 1.6% increase in the relative average of absolute analyst forecast errors (t-
statistic of 2.04). However, I find no statistically significant relation between changes in 
trade secrecy values, as measured by ex post litigation outcomes, and changes in analyst 
forecast errors.27 
                                                          
27 In unreported analyses, I find that trade secrecy has no effect, or a weakly positive effect, on earnings 
informativeness, suggesting the information asymmetry effects I document are not due to declines in the 
ability of GAAP to accurately reflect the production process. In particular, I estimate Eqs. (2) and (3) with 
firms’ cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns, defined as the firm's return over the day prior 
to the day after the annual earnings announcement minus the average return of firms in the same decile 
over the same period, as the dependent variable. I further modify Eqs. (2) and (3) by including firms’ 
unexpected earnings, calculated as actual earnings per share minus the analyst consensus forecast, deflated 
by stock price at end of quarter (Unexpected Earnings). I interact firms’ unexpected earnings with my trade 
secrecy variables. I also modify the resulting specification to include an indicator for whether unexpected 
earnings were negative and by interacting unexpected earnings with all of the included controls. In the 
majority of specifications, there is no statistically significant or economically meaningful relation between 
changes in trade secrecy and changes in the value relevance of unexpected earnings. The lone exceptions 
are when using the passage of the UTSA as a shock to trade secrecy after modifying the baseline 
specification (UTSA x Unexpected Earnings coefficient estimates of 0.106 and 0.118 and t-statistics of 1.94 
and 2.24 when including a loss indicator and when interacting controls, respectively).  
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Table 6 
Trade secrecy and information asymmetry between managers and investors 
This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of information asymmetry between 
managers and investors as a function of the UTSA and my measures of trade secrecy. Firm and year fixed 
effects are included in all columns. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive 
characteristics are found in Table 1. 
Variable: ln(Analyst Error)   ln(Analyst Dispersion) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
UTSA 0.052** . .  0.031
** . . 
 (2.35) . .  (2.41) . . 
Trade Secrecy . 0.016** .  . 0.000 . 
 . (2.04) .  . (0.06) . 
ln(Trade Secret $) . . 0.003  . . 0.008
** 
 . . (0.75)  . . (2.13) 
Inevitable Disclosure  0.048** 0.044* 0.049**  0.012 0.000 -0.004 
  Doctrine (2.12) (1.65) (2.29)  (0.94) (0.00) (-0.29) 
Noncompete Enforcement  -0.002 0.001 0.003  -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  Index (-0.66) (0.31) (0.32)  (-0.52) (-0.04) (0.16) 
ln(Size) -0.117*** -0.122*** -0.118***  -0.081
*** -0.088*** -0.083*** 
 (-10.41) (-10.79) (-8.38)  (-14.22) (-13.79) (-8.15) 
Leverage 0.215*** 0.177*** 0.231***  0.116
*** 0.093*** 0.125** 
 (7.33) (7.68) (3.85)  (3.44) (2.80) (2.28) 
Return on Assets 0.019 0.036 -0.169*  -0.023 -0.011 -0.261
** 
 (0.38) (0.66) (-1.76)  (-0.49) (-0.26) (-2.58) 
Market to Book 0.013** 0.016** 0.009  0.017
*** 0.019*** 0.013* 
 (1.96) (2.40) (0.69)  (3.16) (3.28) (1.71) 
Returns -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.097***  -0.064
*** -0.060*** -0.077*** 
 (-6.90) (-6.87) (-6.01)  (-8.00) (-7.69) (-6.90) 
σReturns 0.369*** 0.337*** 0.395***  0.329
*** 0.292*** 0.394*** 
 (4.24) (3.93) (2.94)  (4.37) (3.91) (3.41) 
Loss 0.115*** 0.109*** 0.105***  0.148
*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 
 (6.63) (5.88) (3.52)  (10.75) (10.25) (5.82) 
Special Items 0.047 -0.004 0.261  0.204
* 0.182 0.463** 
 (0.48) (-0.04) (1.61)  (1.71) (1.52) (2.07) 
Blockholders 0.006** 0.006** 0.014**  0.002 0.001 0.006 
 (2.40) (2.15) (2.37)  (0.76) (0.30) (1.08) 
R&D -0.047 -0.098 -0.119  -0.134 -0.126 0.037 
 (-0.37) (-1.04) (-0.34)  (-1.07) (-1.03) (0.09) 
Missing R&D 0.013 0.012 -0.038  0.008 0.008 0.006 
 (0.59) (0.50) (-0.86)  (0.34) (0.34) (0.21) 
ln(Analysts) -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.039**  0.025
*** 0.023*** 0.019 
 (-5.52) (-4.98) (-2.21)  (3.32) (3.30) (1.54) 
        
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 64,127 56,895 33,388  53,084 47,235 27,552 
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.439 0.508   0.454 0.455 0.544 
 
In contrast, I do find a statistically significant relation between changes in trade 
secrecy values and analyst dispersion in column (6). The results suggest that a doubling of 
trade secret values is associated with a 0.8% increase in analyst dispersion (t-statistic of 
2.13). I also find evidence that the passage of the UTSA caused a 3.1% increase in analyst 
dispersion (t-statistic of 2.41), although I find no evidence of a relation between changes 
in Trade Secrecy and changes in analyst dispersion. In total, the results suggest that relying 
on trade secrecy results in information asymmetry between managers and investors.28  
5.6 Trade secrecy and information asymmetry among investors 
 I present the results of estimating Eqs. (2) and (3) with my measures of information 
asymmetry among investors as dependent variables in Table 7. The results in column (1) 
suggests that the passage of the UTSA caused a relative average increase in the bid-ask 
spread of affected firms of 0.177, equivalent to 6.5% of the sample average (t-statistic of 
3.13). Similarly, the results in column (2) suggest that firms that adopt trade secrecy, as 
measured by 10-K discussions, experience a relative average increase in bid-ask spreads 
of 0.059, equivalent to 2.2% of the sample average (t-statistic of 2.56). The results in 
                                                          
28 In unreported analyses, I find no evidence of a relation between changes in trade secrecy and changes in 
manager forecast precision, relative bias, or accuracy. In particular, I find a coefficient estimate (t-statistic) 
of 0.003(0.52), 0.004(0.66), and 0.002(1.04) on UTSA, Trade Secrecy, and ln(Trade Secret $), respectively, 
when using manager forecast precision (defined as -1 * the forecast range) as the dependent variable in 
Eqs. (2) and (3). I find a coefficient estimate (t-statistic) of 0.001(0.12), -0.015(-0.73), and 0.001(0.19) 
when using manager relative bias (defined as the difference between the manager’s forecast and the analyst 
consensus forecast) as the dependent variable and of 0.018(0.84), 0.033(0.95), and -0.01(-1.01) when using 
manager forecast error (defined in the same way as analyst forecast error) as the dependent variable. This 
suggests that the results in Table 6 reflect increases in information asymmetry, and not general increases in 
uncertainty. 
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column (3) suggest that a doubling of the value of the firm’s trade secrets is associated with 
a 3% relative average increase in bid-ask spreads (t-statistic of 3.11).29  
Table 7 
Trade secrecy and information asymmetry among investors 
This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of information asymmetry among investors 
as a function of the UTSA and my measure of trade secrecy. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all 
columns. All variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. 
Variable: Bid-Ask Spread   Amihud Illiquidity 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
UTSA 0.177*** . .  0.226
*** . . 
 (3.13) . .  (3.28) . . 
Trade Secrecy . 0.059** .  . 0.035 . 
 . (2.56) .  . (0.85) . 
ln(Trade Secret $) . . 0.030***  . . 0.006 
 . . (3.11)  . . (0.26) 
Inevitable Disclosure  0.092* 0.123* 0.156*  0.087 -0.019 0.044 
  Doctrine (1.87) (1.86) (1.78)  (1.08) (-0.25) (0.29) 
Noncompete Enforcement  -0.043*** -0.019 -0.047***  -0.056
* -0.034* -0.074** 
  Index (-3.86) (-1.41) (-3.70)  (-1.81) (-1.69) (-2.13) 
ln(Size) -0.797*** -0.571*** -0.657***  -1.204
*** -1.021*** -1.178*** 
 (-11.61) (-12.65) (-12.11)  (-9.14) (-7.66) (-7.68) 
Leverage 0.810*** 0.456*** 0.597***  0.842
*** 0.256 0.153 
 (7.21) (2.94) (3.52)  (3.58) (1.16) (0.42) 
Return on Assets -0.957*** -0.688*** -0.680**  -1.554
*** -0.997*** -1.795*** 
 (-7.48) (-4.91) (-2.17)  (-4.11) (-3.10) (-2.66) 
Market to Book 0.017 -0.004 0.027  0.160
*** 0.164*** 0.198*** 
 (1.04) (-0.27) (1.02)  (4.49) (5.02) (4.27) 
Returns -0.344*** -0.222*** -0.288***  -0.281
*** -0.174*** -0.231*** 
 (-6.77) (-4.43) (-4.79)  (-4.13) (-2.66) (-2.74) 
σReturns 0.144 -0.515 -0.342  -0.694 -1.332
** -0.876 
 (0.36) (-1.38) (-0.63)  (-1.16) (-2.00) (-0.96) 
Loss 0.341*** 0.188*** 0.248***  0.571
*** 0.334*** 0.399*** 
 (7.06) (4.55) (4.64)  (5.77) (4.66) (4.16) 
Special Items 0.906*** 0.567** 0.715  1.743
*** 0.776 1.627 
 (3.85) (1.99) (1.53)  (3.36) (1.26) (1.43) 
Blockholders -0.024* -0.012 -0.007  -0.047
** -0.044** -0.051** 
 (-1.91) (-1.03) (-0.41)  (-2.24) (-2.11) (-2.04) 
R&D -2.036*** -1.472*** -0.761  -3.967
*** -2.879*** -0.678 
 (-5.04) (-4.02) (-0.70)  (-5.85) (-3.83) (-0.39) 
                                                          
29 Including fiscal year-end closing price as a control does not significantly affect these results; coefficient 
estimate (t-statistic) of 0.0.174(3.10), 0.059(2.55), and 0.030(3.14) on UTSA, Trade Secrecy, and ln(Trade 
Secret $), respectively (Cheong and Thomas, 2017).  
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Missing R&D 0.071 0.031 0.022  0.029 0.110 0.173 
 (0.90) (0.62) (0.31)  (0.29) (1.17) (1.22) 
        
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 107,746 72,645 49,153  107,746 72,645 49,153 
Adjusted R2 0.798 0.801 0.815   0.651 0.642 0.666 
 
In contrast, I find no evidence in columns (5) and (6) of a relation between changes 
in my trade secrecy measures and changes in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. 
However, I document a positive and statistically significant relation between the passage 
of the UTSA and changes in the illiquidity of affected firms’ stock. Specifically, the results 
in column (4) suggest that the law’s passage caused a relative increase in average illiquidity 
of 0.226, equivalent to 14.5% of the sample average (t-statistic of 3.28). In total, the results 
suggest that relying on trade secrecy causes information asymmetry among investors, in 
addition to between managers and investors.30 
5.7 Additional state controls 
Arguably, the most important assumption of my differences-in-differences tests is 
that the passage of the UTSA was exogenous with respect to changes in firm outcomes, 
conditional on the model’s controls (i.e., the parallel trends assumption). A potential 
concern is that states that passed the UTSA were dissimilar to states that did not, and that 
these differences affected firm outcomes. Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996) find that this was 
                                                          
30 In unreported analyses, I find that the relation between Trade Secrecy and information asymmetry 
declines the longer the firm pursues trade secrecy, consistent with subsequent performance revealing the 
value of the trade secret. In contrast, the relation between Trade Secrecy and redactions, forecasts, and 
patenting activity remains unchanged, or even grows, the longer the firm pursues trade secrecy. These 
results are consistent with firms continuing to protect the nature of the trade secret, forecast activity today 
representing a commitment to subsequent forecasting activity, and firms changing how they protect 
innovations when relying on trade secrecy, respectively. 
47 
 
not the case, and that states pass uniform laws mainly because of the efforts of the ULC.31 
I also find no observable systematic differences between states that passed the UTSA and 
states that did not. Nonetheless, in this section, I modify Eq. (3) by including the additional 
controls for state characteristics described in Table 8, Panel A.  
Table 8  
Panel A: Additional state controls 
This Table presents definitions and descriptive statistics for additional state controls.  
 
Additional state controls 
Implied Contract Doctrine An indicator equal to one if the headquarters state judiciary has 
applied the implied contract doctrine (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab, 
2006). 
R&D Tax Credit Headquarters state statutory rate at which firms can claim a R&D tax 
credit. 
Republican Governor An indicator equal to one if the headquarters state’s governor 
identifies as Republican. 
Republican Legislature An indicator equal to one if all houses of the headquarters state's 
legislature have a majority of members who identify as Republican 
and zero otherwise. 
State Economic Growth The change in gross state product, scaled by the beginning gross state 
product. 
Manager Tax Rate Highest combined federal and headquarters state income tax rate, 
assuming the individual is in top brackets at both the federal and state 
levels, married filing jointly with $150,000 in deductible property 
taxes, and allowing for deductibility of state income taxes in states 
where applicable (Armstrong, Glaeser, Huang, and Taylor, 2017). 
State Corporate Tax Rate Highest headquarters state corporate tax rate (Ljungqvist, Zhang, and 
Zuo, 2017). 
Investment Tax Credit Headquarters state statutory rate at which firms may claim an 
investment tax credit. 
 
Additional state controls descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
                                                          
31 In unreported analyses, I use the passage of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA) as an 
instrument for the passage of the UTSA. The UTMA was a non-commercial law published by the ULC in 
1983, and subsequently adopted by 49 states 
(http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Transfers%20to%20Minors%20Act). The UTMA is likely a 
viable instrument because the passage of the UTMA is related to the passage of the UTSA for non-
commercial reasons (e.g., lobbying by the ULC), but is not related to business lobbying or commercial 
activity. I find that the UTMA is a relevant instrument in the disclosure samples (first stage t-statistics > 
6.00 and coefficient estimates >.60). It is less relevant in the other samples (t-statistics of 2.01 to 3.14, 
coefficient estimates of .26 to .40). In the second stage, the coefficients are very similar to the coefficients 
in my main UTSA tests, but are only statistically significant at conventional levels when using redactions 
and forecasting activity as dependent variables (coefficient estimates of 0.057, 0.058, 0.097 and t-statistics 
of 2.11, 2.13, and 1.74 when using Redacted 10-K, Guider, and ln(Forecast Frequency) as the dependent 
variable, respectively). 
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Additional state controls :             
Implied Contract Doctrine 176,343 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
R&D Tax Credit 176,343 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Republican Governor 176,343 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Republican Legislature 176,343 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
State Economic Growth 176,343 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 
Manager Tax Rate 176,343 0.39 0.14 0.37 0.42 0.46 
State Corporate Tax Rate 176,343 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 
Investment Tax Credit 176,343 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 
I present the results of estimating the modified Eq. (3) with those dependent 
variables that were statistically significantly related to the passage of UTSA in prior tests 
as dependent variables in Table 8, Panel B. I do not report coefficient estimates or test 
statistics for prior control variables in the interest of parsimony. The results in Table 8, 
Panel B suggest that the inclusion of these additional controls has no significant effect on 
the coefficient estimates for UTSA.32,33 That these additional controls do not alter the 
coefficient estimate on UTSA suggests that they were not systematically related to the 
passage of the UTSA, supporting the parallel trends assumption. 
Table 8 
Panel B: Additional state controls analysis 
      This Table presents results from estimating OLS differences-in-differences regressions of prior 
dependent variables as a function of the UTSA. Controls included in prior analyses are included in all 
columns, but coefficients and test statistics are not reported. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all 
columns. Controls for the number of analysts following the firm are only included in columns (5) and (6). 
All non-additional state control variables are as defined in Appendix C. Additional state controls are as 
defined in Table 8, Panel A. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by 
headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. Additional state control 
descriptive characteristics are found in Table 8, Panel A. 
                                                          
32 None of the eight F-statistics comparing the equality of the UTSA coefficients between Table 8, Panel B 
and prior tests is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
33 Similarly, I do not find that these additional controls affect prior results on the effects of trade secrecy 
when using Trade Secrecy or ln(Trade Secret $) to measure firms’ reliance on trade secrecy. 
Variable: 
ln(Patents 
Filed) Redacted 10-K Guider 
ln(Forecast 
Frequency) 
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Table 8 
Panel B continued: Additional state controls analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
UTSA -0.018
** 0.028** 0.025*** 0.089*** 
 (-2.07) (2.24) (3.40) (4.43) 
Implied Contract Doctrine 0.005 0.010 -0.008 0.029 
 (0.36) (0.64) (-0.59) (0.98) 
R&D Tax Credit 0.074 0.021 0.094 0.083 
 (0.36) (0.25) (0.71) (0.32) 
Republican Governor -0.015
* 0.003 -0.005 -0.024 
 (-1.79) (0.90) (-0.87) (-1.41) 
Republican Legislature 0.010 -0.005 0.003 0.017 
 (0.80) (-1.01) (0.57) (1.02) 
State Economic Growth -0.032 0.017 0.037 0.204 
 (-0.28) (0.40) (0.54) (1.26) 
Manager Tax Rate -0.124 -0.023 0.155 -0.241 
 (-0.88) (-0.19) (1.25) (-1.01) 
State Corporate Tax Rate -0.354 0.102 -0.359 -0.285 
 (-0.94) (0.65) (-1.25) (-0.69) 
Investment Tax Credit 1.111** -0.184 -0.589*** -2.322*** 
 (2.17) (-1.61) (-2.64) (-4.28) 
     
Prior Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 141,571 92,736 99,139 99,139 
Adjusted R2 0.848 0.669 0.634 0.719 
Variable: 
ln(Analyst 
Error) 
ln(Analyst 
Dispersion) Bid-Ask Spread 
Amihud 
Illiquidity 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
UTSA 0.048
** 0.035*** 0.198*** 0.217*** 
 (2.01) (2.58) (3.79) (3.56) 
Implied Contract Doctrine 0.013 0.029 -0.035 -0.015 
 (0.85) (1.15) (-0.53) (-0.14) 
R&D Tax Credit -0.127 -0.125 -0.583 1.144
** 
 (-0.74) (-0.69) (-1.27) (2.03) 
Republican Governor -0.012 -0.004 -0.029 -0.057 
 (-1.03) (-0.53) (-0.96) (-1.64) 
Republican Legislature 0.006 -0.005 0.074 0.083
* 
 (0.44) (-0.49) (1.59) (1.74) 
State Economic Growth 0.002 0.026 0.302 0.355 
 (0.03) (0.35) (1.14) (0.79) 
Manager Tax Rate 0.004 -0.170 -0.132 -0.136 
 (0.03) (-1.13) (-0.23) (-0.18) 
State Corporate Tax Rate 0.586
** 0.408 0.524 1.634** 
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5.8 The parallel trends assumption 
I present the results of estimating Eq. (4) with those dependent variables that were 
statistically significantly related to the passage of UTSA in prior tests as dependent 
variables in Table 9. I include the additional controls described in Section 5.7. I do not 
report coefficient estimates or test statistics for prior control variables in the interest of 
parsimony. None of the eight dependent variables I examine are statistically significantly 
related to the UTSA prior to the law’s passage. However, the coefficient estimate on 
UTSA, t=-1,-2,-3 when using ln(Patents Filed) as the dependent variable is economically large 
and nearly statistically significant (coefficient estimate of -0.023, t-statistic of -1.63). One 
potential explanation is that firms began relying on trade secrecy prior to the UTSA’s 
passage. However, the other results do not support this explanation.34  
Table 9 
The parallel trends assumption 
      This Table presents results from estimating OLS differences-in-differences regressions of prior 
dependent variables as a function of UTSA t=-1,-2,-3; UTSA t=0; UTSA t=1,2,3; UTSA t>3. Prior controls 
and additional state controls are included in all columns, but coefficients and test statistics are not reported. 
Firm and year fixed effects are included in all columns. Controls for the number of analysts following the 
firm are only included in columns (5) and (6). All variables are as defined in Appendix C. t–statistics appear 
in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Sample descriptive 
characteristics are found in Table 1. 
                                                          
34 In particular, if I use my measures of trade secrecy as the dependent variable in Eq. (4) there is 
essentially no effect in the pre-period (coefficient estimates of 0.004(-0.049) and t-statistics of 0.42(-1.01) 
on UTSA, t=-1,-2,-3 when using Trade Secrecy(ln(Trade Secret $)) as the dependent variable in unreported 
analyses.  
 (2.00) (1.07) (0.57) (2.15) 
Investment Tax Credit -0.060 -0.170 -2.481
** -1.950** 
 (-0.45) (-0.68) (-2.21) (-2.49) 
     
Prior Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 64,127 53,084 107,746 107,746 
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.454 0.798 0.651 
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  I conclude that in total my results are not explained by pre-existing differential 
trends, although some caution should be used when interpreting the effect of the UTSA on 
patenting activity. I also conclude that the effects of the UTSA occur relatively gradually 
after the passage of the law, as evidence by the small, statistically insignificant coefficient 
estimates on UTSAi,t=0.  
5.9 Extension: The nature of withheld information 
In this section, I extend my main analyses by examining the type of information 
firms withhold to protect their trade secrets. To do so, I collect information on redacted 
material contracts and classify them based on a modified version of the classification 
introduced by Boone et al. (2016). Because this analysis requires extensive hand collection, 
I limit the analysis to the sample of firms that adopt or cease trade secrecy and a matched 
sample of control firms that did not.  
Variable: 
ln(Patents 
Filed) Redacted 10-K Guider 
ln(Forecast 
Frequency) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
UTSA, t=-1,-2,-3 -0.023 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013 
 
(-1.63) (-0.26) (-0.77) (-1.33) 
UTSA, t=0 -0.024 0.000 -0.005 0.010 
 
(-1.31) (0.02) (-0.65) (0.52) 
UTSA, t=1,2,3 -0.023 0.017
* 0.006 0.008 
 
(-1.42) (1.71) (1.54) (0.61) 
UTSA, t > 3 -0.021
** 0.028** 0.024** 0.090*** 
 
(-2.03) (2.25) (2.56) (3.94) 
     
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 141,571 92,736 99,139 99,139 
Adjusted R2 0.848 0.669 0.634 0.720 
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5.9.1 Matching procedure 
I use propensity score matching to match firms that change their reliance on trade 
secrecy to samples of control firms that did not. Specifically, I estimate the propensity score 
for the adoption of Trade Secrecy (defined as Trade Secrecy changing from 0 to 1 between 
two years) and the cessation of Trade Secrecy (defined as Trade Secrecy changing from 1 
to 0 between two years) as a function of the change in my 13 control variables. I then 
separately match trade secret adopters and trade secrecy ceasers to firms that did not adopt 
or cease trade secrecy. I one-to-one nearest neighbor match without replacement. I assess 
the quality of the resulting match by examining covariate balance between treatment firms 
and control firms in Table 10, Panel A. None of the differences in means between the 
treatment sample and the control sample are statistically significant, suggesting the match 
is high quality. 
Table 10  
Panel A: Matched sample covariate balance 
This Table presents the difference in means for a sample of firms that adopt or cease trade secrecy, and a 
sample of firms that do not. The samples are one-to-one matched without replacement based on nearest 
neighbor propensity scores calculated using the change in control variables. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix C. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by headquarters 
state and year. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), 
respectively.  
     
     t-statistic 
 
Trade Secret 
Adopters 
Matched 
Sample 
Difference in 
Means 
of the 
Difference 
Change Inevitable Disclosure      
   Doctrine 0.006 0.005 0.001 (0.04) 
Change Noncompete Enforcement      
   Index 0.012 0.013 -0.001 (-0.20) 
Change ln(Size) -0.057 -0.055 -0.002 (-0.45) 
Change Leverage 0.015 0.016 -0.001 (-0.66) 
Change Return on Assets -0.030 -0.032 0.002 (0.65) 
Change Market to Book -0.269 -0.258 -0.011 (-0.45) 
Change Returns -0.063 -0.070 0.007 (0.48) 
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5.9.2 Redacted material contract types 
I focus this analysis on the redaction of material contracts, consistent with prior 
work on redactions (e.g., Verrecchia and Weber, 2006; Boone et al., 2016). Item 601 of 
regulation S-K requires firms to file any material contracts as exhibits and include an 
exhibit table with the 10-K. The exhibit table provides a centralized repository of the 
number of material contracts, the number of redacted contracts, and the nature of the 
Change σReturns 0.006 0.007 -0.001 (-0.88) 
Change Loss 0.016 0.021 -0.005 (-0.67) 
Change Special Items -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 (-0.56) 
Change Blockholders 0.126 0.120 0.006 (0.36) 
Change R&D 0.006 0.006 0.000 (0.25) 
Change Missing R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.11) 
     
Number of Observations 9,762 9,762 . . 
     
    t-statistic 
 
Trade Secret 
Ceasers 
Matched 
Sample 
Difference in 
Means 
of the 
Difference 
Change Inevitable Disclosure      
  Doctrine 0.004 0.006 -0.002 (-0.68) 
Change Noncompete Enforcement      
   Index 0.000 0.007 -0.007 (-0.69) 
Change ln(Size) -0.002 0.002 -0.004 (-0.32) 
Change Leverage 0.007 0.006 0.001 (0.24) 
Change Return on Assets -0.007 -0.007 0.000 (0.00) 
Change Market to Book -0.044 -0.029 -0.015 (-0.69) 
Change Returns -0.040 -0.032 -0.008 (-0.47) 
Change σReturns 0.000 -0.001 0.001 (0.62) 
Change Loss 0.021 0.027 -0.006 (-0.77) 
Change Special Items -0.001 -0.002 0.001 (0.23) 
Change Blockholders 0.100 0.079 0.021 (1.01) 
Change R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.32) 
Change Missing R&D -0.002 0.002 -0.004 (-1.25) 
     
Number of Observations 5,859 5,859 . . 
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contracts. To further limit the extent of hand collection, I focus on firm-years where 
Redacted 10-K changed.35  
I classify material contracts using the procedure outlined in Boone et al. (2016). I 
modify their classification for my setting by considering customer and suppler contracts 
separately; combining credit, lease, and stockholder contracts into a single category; and 
separating research and consulting contracts, including the latter with peer contracts. These 
changes result in the seven contract variables describes in Table 10, Panel B. I report 
descriptive statistics for these new variables in Table 10, Panel B. I provide abridged 
examples of an exhibit table and each redacted contract type in Appendix D.  
Table 10  
Panel B: Redacted material contracts 
This Table presents definitions and descriptive statistics for redacted material contract types. The material 
contract type classification is based on a modified version of the classification introduced by Boone et al. 
(2016). 
 
Redacted Material Contract Types 
License or Royalty The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
license or royalty agreements, divided by the total number of contracts 
in the year that Redacted 10-K changed.  
Peer or Consulting The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
non-research joint ventures, strategic alliances, partnerships, co-
branding, advertising, or consulting agreements, divided by the total 
number of contracts in the year that Redacted 10-K changed. 
Research The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
research and development agreements, alliances, or partnerships, 
divided by the total number of contracts in the year that Redacted 10-
K changed. 
Capital or Acquisition The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
credit, leasing, or shareholder agreements or acquisition activity, 
divided by the total number of contracts in the year that Redacted 10-
K changed. 
Employment The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
employment arrangements, divided by the total number of contracts in 
the year that Redacted 10-K changed. 
                                                          
35 Consequently, I do not capture the effect of small changes in redactions (e.g., moving from six redacted 
contracts to five). I focus on major changes in redactions because I expect this to be a powerful setting that 
does not require hand collection across all 31,242 firm-years. Ignoring the information in small redaction 
changes should work against finding statistically significant results.  
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Supplier or Purchase The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
manufacturing, inventory, distribution, vendor, production, or 
purchase from/by other parties, divided by the total number of 
contracts in the year that Redacted 10-K changed. 
Customer or Sale The change in the number of redacted material contracts related to 
manufacturing, inventory, distribution, vendor, production, or sale 
to/for other parties, divided by the total number of contracts in the 
year that Redacted 10-K changed.  
 
Redacted material contract descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
       
Redacted contract types:             
License or Royalty 31,242 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Peer or Consulting 31,242 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Research 31,242 0.04 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital 31,242 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Employment 31,242 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Supplier or Purchase 31,242 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Customer or Sale 31,242 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 I then use my redacted contract type variables as dependent variables in the 
following changes regression: 
   ∆Contract Typei,t = β0 + β1∆Trade Secrecyi,t + γ'∆Xi,t + YearFE +εi,t            (5) 
I predict that the redaction of license and royalty contracts will be positively related to 
changes in trade secrecy, as these contracts often include specification and feature 
information that may help competitors misappropriate a trade secret. For this same reason, 
I predict that the redaction of customer or sales contracts will be positively related to 
changes in trade secrecy. I also predict that the redaction of research contracts will be 
positively related to changes in trade secrecy, as research contracts include information 
about innovative projects that may be protected by trade secrecy. Finally, I predict that the 
redaction of supplier or purchase contracts will be positively related to changes in trade 
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secrecy, as these contracts often include key information about the materials used in the 
production of trade secrets. 
In contrast, I predict that the redaction of peer or consulting contracts will be 
unrelated to changes in trade secrecy, as it is unlikely that non-research joint venture, 
advertising, or consulting agreements include proprietary information about a trade secret. 
For this same reason, I predict that the redaction of capital or acquisition contracts will be 
unrelated to changes in trade secrecy. Finally, I predict that the redaction of employment 
contracts will be unrelated to changes in trade secrecy because employment contracts rarely 
include proprietary information about trade secrets.   
5.9.3 Changes in trade secrecy and changes in redacted contract types 
I present the results of estimating Eq. (5) with each of my seven measures of 
redacted material contract types as the dependent variable in Table 11. I list the sign of my 
predictions for each contract type because I make a large number of predictions. I do not 
report coefficient estimates or test statistics for control variables in the interest of 
parsimony.  
Table 11 
Trade secrecy and changes in redacted material contracts 
This Table presents results from estimating OLS regressions of changes in material contract types on changes 
in Trade Secrecy and control variables. Year fixed effects are included in all columns. Controls are included 
in all columns, but coefficients and test statistics are not reported. All non-material contract variables are as 
defined in Appendix C. Material contract variables are as defined in Table 9, Panel B. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by headquarters state and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. All non-material contract 
sample descriptive characteristics are found in Table 1. Material contract descriptive characteristics are found 
in Table 10, Panel B. 
Variable: 
Change in 
License or 
Royalty 
Change in Peer 
or Consulting 
Change in 
Research 
Change in 
Capital or 
Acquisition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Change in Trade  0.005 -0.000 0.291*** -0.005 
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Table 11, continued 
Trade secrecy and changes in redacted material contracts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inconsistent with my prediction, I do not find evidence of a statistically significant 
relation between changes in the use of trade secrecy and changes in the redaction of license 
or royalty contracts in column (1). However, I find a statistically significant relation 
between changes in trade secrecy and changes in the redaction of research, supplier or 
purchase, and customer or sale contracts, consistent with my predictions. In particular, the 
results suggest firms that begin relying on trade secrecy, as measured by my disclosure 
measure, increase their redaction of research, supplier or purchase, and customer or sale 
agreements by 60.6%, 60%, and 46.6% of their sample standard deviation, respectively (t-
statistics of 4.48, 3.60, and 3.34, respectively). As predicted, I also find no evidence of a 
statistically significant relation between changes in the use of trade secrecy and changes in 
  Secrecy (1.48) (-0.01) (4.48) (-1.23) 
     
Prediction: + 0 + 0 
     
Change in Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 31,242 31,242 31,242 31,242 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.003 0.048 0.002 
Variable: 
Change in 
Employment 
Change in 
Supplier or 
Purchase 
Change in 
Customer or Sale 
  (5) (6) (7) 
    
Change in Trade  0.017 0.192*** 0.149*** 
  Secrecy (0.98) (3.60) (3.34) 
    
Prediction: 0 + + 
    
Change in Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 31,242 31,242 31,242 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.025 0.021 
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the redaction of peer or consulting, capital or acquisition, and employment contracts. These 
results shed light on how firms use redactions to protect proprietary information about their 
trade secrets. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I study the determinants and consequences of trade secrecy using three 
complementary empirical approaches. The inferences I draw from all three approaches are 
largely the same: managers relying on trade secrecy reduce their voluntary disclosure of 
proprietary information and increase their voluntary disclosure of nonproprietary 
information. The total effect of trade secrecy is a decline in corporate transparency. These 
findings speak to the literature on proprietary costs by demonstrating that proprietary 
information can both increase and decrease disclosure depending on the proprietary content 
of the disclosure. Accordingly, my findings suggest subsequent research should distinguish 
between disclosures that can reveal proprietary information and those that cannot when 
testing theories about the effects of proprietary costs on disclosure.   
I also contribute to the literature on firm innovation by showing that trade secrecy 
causes a decline in patenting activity. This finding suggests that the large literature that 
infers a decline in innovation from a decline in patenting activity is incomplete, as a 
substitution towards trade secrecy can also cause a decline in patenting activity. My work 
represents one of the few empirical studies of trade secrecy. I study a large number of 
determinants and consequences, but by no means an exhaustive set. However, I also 
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develop and validate an empirical measure of firms that rely on trade secrecy, which may 
be of use in future research on trade secrecy. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. The UTSA by state and year 
 
I list the year in which the UTSA was first effective for each state and the District of 
Columbia. Massachusetts and New York have not enacted a version of the law. 
 
 
  
                                                          
36 The Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Committee of the North Carolina Bar Association initially sought 
to adopt the entirety of the UTSA, but decided that the definition sections were overly lengthy and 
complicated. See, e.g., Root and Blynn (1982) who draw on letters, drafts, and other papers, as well as 
telephone interviews in 1981 with the sponsor of the bill, Hon. Marvin D. Musslewhite, Jr. As such, I code 
North Carolina as having passed the UTSA from 1981 onwards. 
37 South Carolina repealed the UTSA in 1997 and replaced it with code law that has been viewed as 
providing, “even greater protection for trade secrets” –  see Petitioner's Final Brief, Laffitte, 381 SC 460, 
674 SE2d 154. As such, I code South Carolina as having passed the UTSA from 1992 onwards. 
38 Wisconsin adopted most of the UTSA’s provisions but continues to use the Restatement of Torts’ 
definition of 
“trade secrets.” I code Wisconsin as having passed the UTSA from 1986 onwards. 
State Year   State Year  
Alabama  1987  Montana 1985 
Alaska  1988  Nebraska  1988 
Arizona 1990  Nevada  1987 
Arkansas  1981  New Hampshire  1990 
California 1985  New Jersey 2012 
Colorado 1986  New Mexico 1989 
Connecticut  1983  New York  N/A 
Delaware  1982  North Carolina  1981
36 
Florida  1988  North Dakota  1983 
Georgia  1990  Ohio 1994 
Hawaii  1989  Oklahoma  1986 
Idaho  1981  Oregon  1988 
Illinois  1988  Pennsylvania  2004 
Indiana  1982  Rhode Island  1986 
Iowa  1990  South Carolina 1992
37 
Kansas  1981  South Dakota 1988 
Kentucky 1990  Tennessee  2000 
Louisiana  1981  Texas 2013 
Maine 1987  Utah 1989 
Maryland  1989  Vermont 1996 
Massachusetts  N/A  Virginia  1986 
Michigan  1998  Washington 1982 
Minnesota 1980  Washington D.C. 1989 
Mississippi 1990  West Virginia  1986 
Missouri 1995  Wisconsin 1986
38 
   Wyoming 2006 
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Appendix B. Examples of 10-K discussions of trade secrecy 
 
I search all 10-K filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database for references to “trade secrecy” 
or “trade secrets.” I present representative examples of such references below. 
 
In order to protect its trade secrets and un-patented proprietary information 
arising from its development activities, AbTech Industries requires its employees, 
consultants and contractors to enter into agreements providing for 
confidentiality, non-disclosure and Company ownership of any trade secret or 
other un-patented proprietary information developed by employees, consultants 
or contractors during their employment or engagement by AbTech Industries. 
-Abtech Holdings 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2011 
 
En Pointe relies primarily on trade secrets, proprietary knowledge and 
confidentiality agreements to establish and protect its rights in its proprietary 
technologies, and to maintain its competitive position. 
-En Pointe 10-K for the year ended September 30, 1998 
 
The Company relies on trade secret protection for its proprietary deinking 
technology which is not covered by patent. 
-Fort Howard Corporation 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1996 
 
None of JSLT's products are covered by patents, but are produced under 
conditions of trade secrecy. 
-Jet Set Life 10-K for the year ended June 30, 1999 
 
We have the exclusive rights to 30 flavor concentrates developed with our current 
flavor concentrate suppliers, which we protect as trade secrets. We will continue 
to take appropriate measures, such as entering into confidentiality agreements 
with our contract packers and exclusivity agreements with our flavor houses, to 
maintain the secrecy and proprietary nature of our flavor concentrates. 
-Jones Soda Company 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 
 
Competitors also may obtain patents that the Company would need to license or 
design around. These factors also tend to limit the value of the Company's existing 
patents. Consequently, in certain instances, the Company may consider trade 
secret protection to be a more effective method of maintaining its proprietary 
positions. 
-Minntech Corporation 10-K for the year ended March 31, 1996 
 
The Company does not apply for patents on its speech recognition techniques that 
it maintains as trade secrets because of the disclosure requirements in doing so. 
-Voice Control Systems, Inc. 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998 
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Appendix C. Variable Definitions 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Amihud Illiquidity The average daily value of the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity: 
 
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
1
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∑
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡,𝑑|
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑑
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1
 × 107 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 is the daily return and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 is the daily dollar 
volume (in millions). 
Bid-Ask Spread The average daily value of the bid-ask spread, scaled by price: 
   
𝐵𝑖𝑑 − 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
1
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∑
𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑑
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑑
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑑=1
 × 100 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 (𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑑) is the quoted closing ask(bid) and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 is the 
closing price on day 𝑑. 
Blockholders The number of shareholders listed on Thomson Reuters with 5% or more 
ownership of the firm. 
Guider An indicator equal to one if the manager releases at least one earnings 
forecast. 
Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine 
An indicator equal to one if the headquarters state judiciary applies the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
Leverage Book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. 
ln(Analyst 
Dispersion) 
The natural logarithm of one plus the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
𝜎𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
|𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡|
× 10)  
ln(Analyst Error) The natural logarithm of one plus the absolute value of the median 
consensus forecast, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings: 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟) = 𝑙𝑛 (1 +
|𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡|
|𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡|
× 10) 
ln(Analysts) The natural logarithm of the number of analysts with one-year ahead 
earnings forecasts. 
ln(Forecast 
Frequency) 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of management earnings 
forecasts. 
ln(Patent Citations) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of future citations received on 
patents filed in the year. 
ln(Patents Filed) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents filed in the year. 
ln(Size) The natural logarithm of the market value of the firm’s equity.  
Loss An indicator equal to one if net income is negative. 
Market to Book Market value of assets to book value of assets. 
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Missing R&D An indicator equal to one if data on R&D expenditures is missing. 
Noncompete 
Enforcement Index 
The noncompete enforcement index developed by Garmaise (2009). 
R&D R&D expenditures scaled by total assets. Missing values of R&D are 
replaced by zeroes. 
Redacted 10-K An indicator equal to one if the 10-K filing includes mention of 
"confidential information" "confidential treatment" "redacted" "CT order" 
"FOIA" "rule 406" or "rule 24b-2.” 
Return on Assets Income before extraordinary items scaled by assets. 
Returns Buy and hold return over the fiscal year. 
Special Items Special items scaled by total assets. 
Trade Secrecy An indicator equal to one if the firm’s 10-K filing mentions “trade secret” or 
“trade secrecy.” 
ln(Trade Secret $) The natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value of trade secrets revealed 
in trade secret legal settlements or judgements. I identify trade secret cases 
using all cases tried criminally under the Economic Espionage Act and text 
searches of 10-K filings. Data on the trade secret value and development 
date must be available. Dollar values are inflation adjusted from the 
settlement or judgement year to the years the trade secret was in use using 
the consumer price index. 
UTSA An indicator equal to one if the firm’s headquarters state has enacted the 
UTSA. 
UTSAi,t=-1,-2,-3 An indicator equal to one in each of the three years prior to the passage of 
the UTSA. 
UTSAi,t=0 An indicator equal to one in the year the UTSA was first passed. 
UTSAi,t=1,2,3 An indicator equal to one in each of the three years after the UTSA was first 
passed. 
UTSAi,t>3 An indicator equal to one four years after the UTSA was first passed, and 
thereafter. 
σReturns The standard deviation of monthly returns. 
  
64 
 
Appendix D. Examples of redacted contract types 
 
I hand collect the list of material contracts from the 10-K and classify redacted contracts 
based on a modified version of the classification introduced by Boone et al. (2016). I 
present an example of a 10-K table of material contracts along with representative 
examples of each type of redacted material contract below.  
 
Example of 10-K table of material contracts: 
(a) (3) Exhibits. 
 
   The following Exhibits are incorporated herein by reference or are 
filed 
with this report as indicated below. 
 
<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
 Number                                                           
Description 
 ------                                                           -----
------ 
<S>         <C> 
3.1*        Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation. 
3.2**       Amended and Restated By-laws. 
4.1***      Specimen common stock certificate. 
4.2         See Exhibits 3.1 and 3.2 for provisions of the Amended and 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation and Amended and 
            Restated By-laws of the Registrant defining the rights of 
holders of Common Stock of the Registrant. 
10.1***     1999 Stock Incentive Plan. 
 
… 
10.24++     Software Development and Service Agreement, effective 
January 15,  
            2001, by and between the Registrant and BellSouth  
      Telecommunications, Inc. 
21.1        List of Subsidiaries. 
23.1        Consent of Arthur Andersen LLP. 
- --------------- 
*    Incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.2 of Predictive's 
Registration 
     Statement on Form S-1, No. 333-84045 ("Registration Statement No. 
333- 
     84045"). 
**   Incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.4 of Registration Statement 
No. 
     333-84045. 
***  Incorporated by reference to the identically numbered exhibit of 
     Registration Statement No. 333-84045. 
+    Non-confidential portions of this Exhibit were filed as the 
identically 
     numbered exhibit of Registration Statement No. 333-84045, which 
non- 
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     confidential portions are incorporated herein by reference. 
Confidential 
     treatment was granted for certain portions of this Exhibit 
pursuant to 
     Rule 406 promulgated under the Securities Act. Confidential 
portions of 
     this Exhibit have been filed separately with the Securities and 
Exchange 
     Commission. 
++   Confidential treatment to be requested for certain portions of 
this 
     Exhibit pursuant to Rule 406 promulgated under the Securities Act. 
     Confidential portions of this Exhibit have been filed separately 
with    
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 
-Predictive Systems, Inc. 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2000 
License or royalty: 
 
RESTATED DRAM LICENSE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT 
      This Restated DRAM License and Cooperation Agreement 
("Agreement") is entered into as of February 28, 1996, by and between  
Alliance Semiconductor Corporation, a Delaware corporation  with its 
principal offices at 3099 North First Street, San Jose, California, 
tel. (408) 383-4900; fax (408) 383-4990 (collectively, Alliance 
Semiconductor Corporation and its Taiwan subsidiar(ies) will be 
referred to as "Alliance")… 
 
… 2.3 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, [*] and Alliance: (i) 
Alliance will [*], (ii) UMC will [*], (iii) all such [*] under this 
Agreement, and (v) the [*].  At the request of Alliance, UMC will [*] 
Specifically, but without limitation, upon request by Alliance, UMC [*] 
If, for any reason, such [*], then UMC will [*]. To this end, UMC shall 
[*]. UMC hereby [*] 
 
-Alliance Semiconductor Corporation 10-K for the year ended March 31, 1997 
 
Peer or consulting: 
 
ADVERTISING SALES AGENCY AGREEMENT 
 
                              DATED MARCH 14, 2001 
 
 
Confidential Treatment has been requested with respect to certain 
information 
contained in this Exhibit… 
 
…6.1.   The parties shall agree the Sales Budget for a particular 
calendar year on or before 30 November of the preceding year. If such 
agreement is not reached, the Sales Budget shall be the actual level of 
sales in US Dollars in the previous year plus a [*] increase. The Sales 
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Budget shall not include any amounts for political or religious 
Advertising revenues. 
 
6.2.   The CPP and the Rate Card shall be agreed between the parties 
before reaching agreement on the Sales Budget. The Agent may not 
propose a discount greater than [*] from the Rate Card price without 
the prior written consent of Studio 1+1 Group. 
 
- Central European Media Enterprises Ltd 10-K for the year ended December 
31, 2000 
 
Research: 
 
    THIS COLLABORATION AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is dated as of May 
22, 2001 (the "Effective Date") by and between EXELIXIS, INC., a 
Delaware corporation having its principal place of business at 170 
Harbor Way, P.O. Box 511, South San Francisco, California 94083-0511 
("EXEL"), and PROTEIN DESIGN LABS, INC., a Delaware corporation having 
its principal place of business at 34801 Campus Drive, Fremont, 
California 94555-3606 ("PDL"). EXEL and PDL are sometimes referred to 
herein individually as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties." 
 
                  RECITALS 
 
   A. PDL has expertise and capability in developing antibodies, in 
particular humanized antibodies, as pharmaceuticals. 
 
   B. EXEL has expertise and proprietary technology relating to drug 
discovery focused particularly on genetic model systems, genomics and 
computational biology and is applying such technology to discover and 
validate targets and products for drug discovery in a variety of 
disease areas. 
 
   C. PDL and EXEL desire to establish a collaboration to utilize the 
technology and expertise of PDL and EXEL to identify and characterize 
targets for the treatment of cancer and precancerous conditions, 
controlling cell growth, apoptosis, and proliferation, to generate 
antibodies directed against 
such targets, and to develop and commercialize novel antibody products 
for diagnostic, prophylactic and therapeutic uses. … 
 
…    1.4  "ANTIBODY  TARGET"  means  [  *  ] 
 
     1.5  "ANTIBODY  TARGET  CANDIDATE"  means  [  *  ] 
 
…        EXHIBIT D-1 
                             THIRD PARTY TECHNOLOGY 
                                      [ * ] 
 
- Exelixis 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2001 
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Capital or acquisition: 
 
SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT 
THIS SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”) is made and dated as of 
this 1st day of February 2005 by and among the individuals and entities 
listed as Existing Shareholders of the Company on Schedule A hereto 
(each an “Existing Shareholder” and, collectively, the “Existing 
Shareholders”)… 
…1.2 “Call Fair Market Value” per Ordinary Share shall be equal to the 
amount determined by [*]. 
-Monster Worldwide 8-K dated January 30, 2005 
Employment: 
 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
This Employment Agreement between CHRISTOPHER WILSON (“Executive”) and 
RENTRAK CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation (“Corporation”), is entered 
into effective as of February 9, 2011 (this “Agreement”). … 
… 2.2.1 Annual Bonus. Executive will be eligible to receive a cash 
bonus for services during each fiscal year during the Term beginning 
with fiscal 2012 and payable, to the extent earned, no later than June 
30 of the following fiscal year. In addition, for the period from the 
Start Date through March 31, 2012, Executive will be eligible to earn a 
bonus (“Revenue Bonus”) based on the net revenues for the Corporation’s 
national linear TV network products and advertising agency and 
advertiser products (“Revenues”) as described below (“Revenue Bonus 
Targets”). If the amount of Revenues is $* million, a bonus of $100,000 
will be earned (“50% Revenue Bonus”). If the amount of Revenues is $* 
million, a bonus of $150,000 will be earned (“75% Revenue Bonus”). If 
the amount of Revenues is $* million or more, a bonus of $200,000 will 
be earned (“100% Revenue Bonus”). If the amount of Revenues is less 
than $* million, no bonus will be earned. 
-Rentrak Corporation 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2011 
 
Supplier or purchase: 
 
Subject:       Letter Agreement No. 6-1162- PJG-064 to Purchase 
               Agreement No. 1663 - Pratt and Whitney Engine Model 
               PW4074 Surge Mapping 
… 
STATEMENT OF WORK 
- ----------------- 
[*CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO A REQUEST FOR 
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT] 
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-UAL Corporation 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1999 
 
Customer or sale: 
 
THIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT AND SERVICES AGREEMENT (hereinafter 
"Agreement") is made by and between BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 
a Georgia corporation, (hereafter "Customer") with offices located at 
675 West Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30375, and Predictive 
Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation (hereinafter "Supplier") having 
an office at 2400 Century Boulevard, Atlanta, GA 30345.  
… 
1.6. "Deliverables" shall mean any and all system deliverables set 
forth in a fully executed Order as defined in Appendix A. 
… 
 
Appendix A 
       [*] 
 
-Predictive Systems, Inc. 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2000 
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